OJO & ORS. V. THE GOVERNOR OF 0Y0 STATE & ORS

• Pages: 1-20

OJO & ORS. V. THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & ORS.

1

OJO & ORS. V. THE GOVERNOR OF

OYO

STATE &

5

ORS.

10

1. PRINCE EYINADE OJO

2.

CHIEF AJIBADE ADESINA

(The Onsa of Ilora)

APPELLANTS

3.

CHIEF J.O. WOJUOLA

(The Ejemu of Ilora)

4.

CHIEF ADEDEWE (of Ilora)

15

V

1.

THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE

2.

THE A-G OF OYO STATE

3.

PRINCE LAYIWOLA OLAWORE



RESPONDENTS

20

4. S.A. LALUDE

(The Secretary, Oyo South Local Govt.)

SUIT NO. SC.218/1985

SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

NNAMANI,

J.S.C.

25

KARIBI-WHYTE,

J.S.C.

OPUTA,

J.S.C.

AGBAJE,

J.S.C.

WALT,

J.S.C.

13th January, 1989

30

Chieftaincy - Selection of Bale - flora Chieftaincy Declaration, 1956 - Kingmakers

Entitlement

Civil Procedure - Concurrent findings - Burden of displacement - Appellant.

35

Constitutional Law - Vested rights - Executive interference - Propriety

ISSUES:

1.

What is the burden on a party who would have an appellate court upset the

40

concurrent findings of lower courts.

2.

Whether a mere

ipsi dixit

by a State Governor is enough to take away vested

statutory rights in the absence of any amendment to the vesting statute, and

regardless of the usual presumption in favour of such rights.

3.

Whether an exercise of power by a Governor in purported pursuance of the

45

provisions of a statute is

bona fide

and valid where such exercise derogates

from vested rights under the same statute.

4.

Whether a statute which application has the effect of divesting vested rights

ought to be construed (as are Penal Statute)

strictissimi juris

(strictly).

5.

Where a statutory right is vested in a person, or group of persons, whether the

50

exercise of such a right by another person or body of persons not legally entitled

so to exercise can be valid.

6.

What is the rationale for the view that concurrent findings of fact in lower courts

ought to be accepted by an appellate court?

2

NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

[19891 1 N.S.C.C.

7.

Whether a right to act as a kingmaker under a statutory power is a constitutional

right.

FACTS:

The 1st appellant was one of the many contestants to the Baleship of llora a tradi-

tional kinglet; and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th appellants were members of the kingmaking

5

class in accordance with tiara Native Law and Custom and as embodied in a 1956

Chieftaincy Declaration by the Governor in Council which was embodied in a statu-

tory document. The 1st appellant was duly selected and appointed Bale-elect by the

Kingmakers but the appointment was set aside by the 1st Respondent following pro-

tests by some members of the llora Community. The Order setting aside the appoint-

10

ment was accompanied by a directive that the Ejemu of flora (the 3rd appellant) and

one other, do not participate in the process of selecting a new Bale elect. The 3rd

appellant disagreeing with the directive insisted on participating and was supported

by the Onsa, (the 2nd appellant)

As a result of the serious disagreements arising from the exclusion of some mem-

15

bers of the kingmaking body, a new Bale could not be selected, whereupon the 1st

defendant/respondent, having caused several letters of warning to be sent to the ap-

pellants, purported to exercise his powers under section 13(1) of the Chiefs Law,

1959. Under the section, the 1st respondent could, in the event of default on the part

of the Kingmakers, appoint warrant kingmakers. Secondly, by virtue of section 9A

20

of the Chiefs (Amendment) Law No.14 of 1963, a Registered Declaration (such as

the 1956 Chieftaincy Declaration) could be amended by the 1st respondent. The 1st

respondent appointed 8 warrant Kingmakers who sat and appointed the 3rd re-

spondent as Bale of llora. Aggrieved by that act, the appellants, instituted an action

in the Oyo High Court, Oyo, seeking a declaration

inter alia,

that the 1956 Bale of

25

!l

ora Chieftaincy Declaration was the only valid declaration in that respect, and that

the appointment of the warrant kingmakers, and the selection of the 3rd respondent

was null and void and of no effect. The High Court found as a fact that the appellants

had defaulted in the exercise of their rights as traditional kingmakers, and that the

1st respondent was therefore entitled to exercise his power under section 13(1) of

30

the Chiefs Law 1959, to appoint warrant kingmakers. It dismissed the plaintiffs' ac-

tion and the latter appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the purported find-

ings of fact by the two lower courts and seeking the same reliefs as they had sought

below.

HELD:

35

1.

That this appeal is concerned with concurrent findings of fact and concurrent

judgments of the two Lower Courts - the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

The burden on the appellant in such circumstances is to show exceptional

circumstances that would justify interference with the concurrent verdict. It is

40

now trite law that a Court of Appeal will not interfer with the findings of fact of a

lower court unless it is satisfied that such findings are perverse, or that the Judge

did not utilise properly, the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses.

Nevertheless, the appeal in this case does not turn on the findings of the lower

court, but on the manner in which the learned trial Judge applied the law to the

45

accepted facts - particularly, on the exclusion of the Ejemu, (3rd appellant) from

participation in the selection of the Bale.

2.

That the rights of a Chief under the flora Chieftaincy Declaration of 1956 being

vested rights, cannot just be set aside by the mere

ipsi dixit

of the Governor -

the 1st Respondent. Vested rights are so jealously guarded by the courts that

50

they look at any legislation which attempts to derogate as if it were a penal

legislation which has to be construed very strictly. There is also a presumption

that the legislature does not intend to limit vested rights further than clearly

appears from the enactment.