PEENOK INVESTMENTS LTD. V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD

• Pages: 477-524

PEENOK INVESTMENTS 1.TD. V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD.



477

5

PEENOK INVESTMENTS LTD. V. HOTEL

PRESIDENTIAL LTD.

PEENOK INVESTMENTS LIMITED



APPELLANT

10



V

HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LIMITED



RESPONDENT

SUIT NO. SC 79/1981

SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

15

20

IRIKEFE,

BELLO,

IDIGBE,

OBASEKI,

ESO,

NNAMANI,

UWAIS,

3rd December, 1982

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

Constitutional Law - Exercise of Legislative powers of State House of Assembly

- Irrelevance of legislature's motive - Compulsory acquisition - Prohibition

against, except in manner and for purposes prescribed by s.31, 1963 Constitution

- Land in dispute already State land - Right to cancel lease of State land

required for public purpose - Parties - Non joinder - Effect - Edicts Nos. 15

and 17 of 1972 challenged as invalid - Inconsistency with Constitution.

ISSUES:

1.

What is the text for joinder of parties in a suit?

2.

Whether the High Court of one State can treat as invalid the law of another State

and thereby ignore it without a proper trial of the issue.

3.

Whether a Federal and State Law must be specifically pleaded before a party

can ask a court to pronounce on it.

4.

Whether a lessee of state land under the State Lands Law (Cap. 122) Laws of

Eastern Nigeria can have his leasehold interest revoked or cancelled during

the life of the lease.

5.

Whether a law can be declared invalid on the grounds that it was made in bad

faith.

6.

What is the appropriate mode of interpretation of statutes which seek to deprive

a citizen of his vested proprietary rights.

FACTS:

The appellant, a limited liability company commenced this action against the

respondent also a limited liability company in the Anambra State High Court claim-

ing arrears of rent for use and occupation of its premises in Port Harcourt and for

mesne profits until judgment. The respondent in its defence claimed that the lease

of the premises in question had been cancelled and the ownership of the property

had reverted to the Rivers State Government in4cordance with River State Edicts

50





Nos. 15 and 17 of 1972. The said Edict were tlie Cancellation of Leases Edict No.

15 as amended by Edict No. 17, and the said cancellation was purportedly done

in the public interest. In response io this defence the appellant sought and ob-

tained leave to raise the following matters by way of reply, that, the purported can-

25

30

35

40

45

478



NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

[1982] N.S.C.C.

cellation of the lease was irregular, vindicture, mala fide and an abuse of power

(part of allegation was that the then Governor of River State had approached the

appellant Company to purchase the premises in question personally but had been

refused), and that the Rivers State Government did not itself did not need the said



building for any public purpose or at all. The appellant adduced evidence through



5

only one witness, the General Manager whilst the respondent called no evidence

and relied solely on Edict 15 and 17. he Rivers State Government was not joined

as a party. After having evidence the trial court upheld the appellant's claim in

part, i.e. up to and including the day immediately before the purported cancella-

tion of their lease.



10

Being dissatisfied the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which dis-

missed the appeal on the grounds that the issue concerning the validity of Edict

15 and 17 were not distinctly raised on the pleadings; that the plaintiff ought to have

joined the Rivers State Government as a party and that not having joined them the



court could not raise issues concerning the validity of acts done under the Edict.



15

This dismissal did not however affect the monetary award granted the appellant

by the High Court.

The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court contending, inter alia, that

in this case it was immaterial whether the state affected appeared as a party or not;



that all the facts on which the appellant relied had been pleaded and it was the duty



20

of the Court of Appeal to determine the case on those facts. The appellant again

raised the issue of the invalidity of Edicts 15 and 17 on the grounds of bad faith

and unconstitutionality.

HELD:



1 (a) The test as to whether there should be a joinder of parties in a suit is based



25

on the need to have before the court such parties as would enable it to "ef-

fectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions" in the

suit.

(b)

Certainly each of the claim before the court can be decided effectually and



completely without the need of bringing the Government of Rivers State as



30

a party

Prima facie

each of the claims is a claim and which the appellant

qua

plaintiff is entitled to pursue and which cannot in any way be said to be

improperly constituted; none of the claim is for a declaratory relief. Accord-

ingly, the government of the River State is not a party who in the language



of rule 11 of the Order 16 Rules of the Supreme Court (England) (which are



35

applicable by virtue of sections 15 and 16 of the High Court Law Cap. 61,

Eastern Nigeria) "ought to have been joined"

in the first instance;

in other

words the government of Rivers State is not a necessary party to the pro-

ceedings under appeal.

(c)

There is no question that, in the case in hand, it cannot be said that the Gov-



40

emment of the Rivers State will be DIRECTLY affected by the result of the

action: undoubtedly the Government may be

indirectly

affected by the pro-

nouncement which could be made, even if only

obiter,

on the Edict, It is

therefore

desirable

to have the said Government joined as a party in order

that it may be bound by the result) the pronouncement therein.



45

(d)

While it is conceded that it is desirable to bring in the Government espe-

cially as the court was called upon to pronounce on the validity of a law of

the Government of the component State of the Federation and so ought in

exercise of its discretionary powers on the question of joinder of parties to



have brought it, sufficient opportunity for intervention was given to the Gov-



50

emment of River State which it failed to take advantage of and so this ac-

tion should not fail for non-joinder of parties.

PEENOK INVESTMENTS LTD. V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD.



479

(e)

(ESO, J.S.C.

dissenting on this issue) That to avoid the Edicts, the gov-

ernment which enacted then must be recognised as having an interest when

the question of their validity is raised in any court and a

fortiori

that govern-

ment must be heard before the court, where the issue is raised. The Court

5





of Appeal was therefore right in that decision that the Rivers State should

have been joined in the act on, not as a matter of practise, but as a matter

of law, before the Edicts could be properly declared invalid. But since the

said Government through its Attorney General ignored the invitation of the

court to attend the having of this appeal this is not a matter where an order

10





should be made stricking out the case for the reason that all the parties were

not before the trial court nor one that should go for a retrial with directions

that the proper parties should be joined.

2 (a) This court is unable to agree that any court can, in a given case, treat the

legislation of any state as if it did not exist or pronounce upon its validity in

15





vacuo. It can only do so in a proper case and in a dispute between the par-

ties appearing before it.

(b) The principle enunciated in the dictum of Lord Denning in

Macfory v. U.A.C.

(1961) 3 W.L.R. 1405 that an act which is void needs no order of court to

set it aside, valid, as it is in tie case where it was enunciated, cannot be ex-

20





tended to legislation and cover a proposition that a court in one state of the

Federation can

suo motu

treat the law enacted by another state as void and

proceed to act on that conclusion without proper trial of its validity by hav-

ing the state that enacted the legislation.

25



3. As a general proposition of law, foreign law which would include the laws of

the component states in a federation such as ours, is a question of fact which

must be pleaded and proved in a trial. In this country however, the actual need

for a proof of a Federal or Stai:e law is not called for, as this in one of those

matters which a court of law is entitled to take judicial notice of under section

30



73(1)(a) of the Evidence Act.

4.

It is a common ground in this case that the appellant holds a lease for 99 years

under the State Lands Law (Cap.122) Laws of Eastern Region of Nigeria.

Section 6 of the Law imposes the obligation on the lessor that he has full power

to grant the lease and that the lessee if he fulfils his own condition shall enjoy

35





the premises without any interruption for as long as the law is in force. No

where in the law is there a provision for cancellation, and section 22 which

deals with the RESUMPTION CF LANDS FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES cannot be

interpreted to cover a case of cancellation of lease which still has 84 years to

run. What the Rivers State Government did is clearly in violation of the provision

40





of section 31 of the 1963 Constitution i.e. the protection of property from

compulsory acquisition except under laws requiring payment of compensation.

Accordingly, Edict No. 15 and 17 and the cancellation notice made in regard

to the appellants property are void, of no effect and unconstitutional as being

inconsistent with the clear and mandatory provisions of section 31 of the 1963

45



Constitution.

5.

A court will not enquire into the motive of a legislation or assume them to be

wrongful. The law is well settled and no distinction should be made as to

whether the legislation is that of the Federal Government or that of a State

Government. No

mala fides

should be imputed to a legislator in regard to his

50



legislation.

6.

It is an accepted canon of interpretation of statute that any law which seeks to

deprive one of his vested proprietary rights must be construed strictly according

to the strict letter of the statute. Put simply that such statutes are to be construed