YUSUFU V. THE STATE

Pages290-305
290
NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES
[1988] 2 N.S.C.C.
YUSUFU V. THE STATE
5
LATIFU YUSUFU
APPELLANT
V
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
10
SUIT NO. SC 9/1987
SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
OBASEKI,
J.S.C.
N NAMAN I ,
J.S.C.
KAWU,
J.S.C.
OPUTA,
J.S.C.
WALT,
J.S.C.
8th July, 1988
Criminal Law and Procedure - Murder - Contrary to Section 319 of the Criminal Code -
Section 28 of the Criminal Code - Distinction between 1st and 2nd limbs - Distinction
between Insanity and Insane Delusion - Concurrent findings of fact of two courts -
Attitude of Supreme Court.
Evidence - Ipse Dalt - Admissibility - Weight to be attached.
Words and Phrases - 'delusion' - Meaning of.
ISSUES:
1.
What is delusion?
2.
What is the distinction between insanity and insane delusion?
3.
Whether a mere
'ipse
dixit'
is admissible evidence.
FACTS:
The Accused/Appellant was charged with the murder of one Muinatu Latifu, his
35
wife, at the Lagos High Court, Ikeja. His defence was that of delusion under section
28 of the Criminal Code. The learned trial judge, after evaluating the evidence be-
fore him, convicted the accused and sentenced him to death. The accused appealed
to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal. He further appealed to the Su-
preme Court, where it was contended on his behalf that the learned trial judge and
40
the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by not clearly drawing a distinction
between the first limb and the second limb of Section 28 of the Criminal Code and
that the Court of Appeal gravely misdirected itself on the length and extent of delu-
sive beliefs, giving the impression that it must have been prolonged or persistent for
a considerable time before it can avail one under section 28 (second limb) of the
Criminal Code.
HELD:
1. Delusion may be defined as the belief of things as realities which exist only in
the imagination of the patient. Thus, mere eccentricity is not enough to
constitute mental unsoundness. There must be an aberration of reason. In the
5
case of
Arum v. The State
(1979) N.S.C.C. 190, the Supreme Court defined
delusion as "a falsely held belief inaccessible to reason and which represents a
departure from previously held patterns of belief and .... which exists out of
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YUSUFU V. THE STATE
291
context with the patterns of belief held by the culture from which the subject
devises."
It is, as defined by counsel for the appellant - 'a firm and unreasonable belief
which is not based on reality and which cannot be removed by any
5
demonstration of it's inaccuracy.
2.
While insanity encompasses delusion, delusion does not encompass insanity.
Where a defence of insanity exists a defence of delusion cannot arise for
consideration. It is subsumed. According to section 28 of the Criminal Code, a
defence of delusion arises only where a defence of insanity is not available to
10
the accused. There is no doubt that the basic cause of insanity and delusion is
a disease of the mind and hence the two defences have been properly treated
and dealt with in the same section, but the degree of illness of the mind in insanity
is infinitely more severe than the degree of illness in delusion. The loss of
capacity in insanity need not attend the state of delusion. But for the distinction
15
made by Section 28 of the Criminal Code in the classification of the criminal
liability attaching to the respective victims of insanity and delusion, detection of
any difference in real life is difficult to make. The only real distinction lies while
trying to establish a defence. For insanity, all that has to be established is
contained in the first limb of section 28. In the second limb, which explains what
20
must be proved to establish insane delusion, the defence consists just of
assuming that the subject of the delusional belief is true and judging the criminal
liability against this i.e. whether the act, assuming that the delusional belief is
true, is one that is punishable or not. One cannot treat the two defences together
or interchangeably since the elements necessary to establish either defence are
25
different.
3.
A party's testimony is admissible evidence and depending on what weight it
carries, may just be all that is needed to sustain that party's case. As was held
in
Ahmed Debs v. Cheico Limited
[198612 N.S.C.C. 837, ''A party's
`ipse dixit'
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could be cross examined like any other evidence. It could be impeached with
another evidence. It could be admitted. It could be left just uncontradicted. It
is for the court in evaluating the evidence to take every circumstance into
consideration.
"There can be no question that a mere"
"ipse dixit"
is
admissible evidence but it is evidence resting on the assertion of one who made
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it; where there is need for further proof, a mere
'ipse dixit'
may not be enough."
[As to
defence of insanity or insane delusion
see 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS 4th
Edition 621 Para 1125]
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Editorial Note:
There is a presumption in law, that every man is sane and accountable for his actions.
This presumption however, is rebuttable. In order to establish the defence of insanity
and rebut the presumption of sanity, it is necessary to prove that at the relevant time,
the accused was suffering from mental disease or natural mental infirmity, that is, a
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defect of reason from the disease of the mind, or a defect in mental power, neither
produced by his own fault, nor the result of a disease of the mind.
In the leading case of
R.
v. Omoni
(1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 511, the court held that our
code differs from the law of England, by the introduction of the element of "natural
mental infirmity" and allowing "incapacity to control his actions" to relieve a person
50
from criminal responsibility.
See further
Willie v. The State
[1968] N.S.C.C. 109
Aiworo v. The State
[1987] II
N.S.C.C. 710

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