ARISA V. THE STATE

• Pages: 139-156

ARISA V. THE STATE

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139

"The court is certainly entitled in its discretion to take points

suo motu

if it sees

fit to do so, but it is not the normal practice, and it is done only if we think in the

special circumstances of the case that justice demands it, such as on a fun-

damental issue as to

whether the trial court has jurisdiction."

(italics supplied

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for emphasis).

In the present appeal, though the issue was not properly raised before the appel-

late High Court, learned counsel for the Respondent became wiser on his appeal to

the Court of Appeal when he specifically raised it. It is so fundamental that it could

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not be ignored and the present appellant (then the respondent) had full knowledge

of that and was therefore not taken by surprise. From the materials placed before

the Court of Appeal, it has all the facts bearing on the issue and that no satisfactory

explanation could have been given in the court below if it had been so raised -

Sa-

muel Fadiora & Anor. v. Festus Gbadebo & Anor.

(1978) 3 S.C. 291. The Court of

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Appeal exercised its discretionary power both judiciously and judicially when it

suo

motu,

and in the best interest of justice, allowed the fundamental issue raised, to be

argued -

Aminu Akindele Ojora & Ors. v. Lasisi Ajibola Odunsi

(1964) N.M.L.R. 12

and

Obadiaru v. Grace Uyigue & Anor.

(1986) 3 S.C. 39.

For these and the fuller reasons contained in the lead judgment on my learned

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brother Obaseki, J.S.C., this appeal fails and it is dismissed. The order of striking

out the. suit made by the Court of Appeal is confirmed, with N500.00 to the Respond-

ent.

Appeal Dismissed.

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ARISA V. THE STATE

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DICKSON ARISA

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APPELLANT

V

THE STATE

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RESPONDENT

SUIT NO. SC 5

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/

1

987

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SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

OBASEKI,



J.S.C.

UWAIS,



J.S.C.

KARIBI-WHYTE,

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J.S.C.

BELGORE,

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J.S.C.

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AGBAJE,

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J.S.C.

1st July, 1988

Criminal Law and Procedure - Murder - Section 319( 1) of the Criminal Code, Cap.30,

Vol.2, laws of Eastern Nigeria (applicable to lino State). Criminal re.sponsihility -

Defences - Insanity, Section 28, Criminal Code - Wizen defence may avail - Presumption

of soundness of mind - Section 27, Criminal Code - Delusions distinguished from

insanity.

Evidence - Burden of proof in Criminal Cases - Insanity - Defence of - Accused's Onus -

Section 140(3)(c) Evidence Act, Cap.62 - Opinion evidence - Section 64, Evidence Act

- Necessity of grounds for opinion to relevance.

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Civil Procedure - Appeals - Wizen an appellate court may support the decision of a lower

court on reasons other than those for which it was given.

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NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

[1988] 2 N.S.C.C.

ISSUES:

1.

Whether antecedent evidence of insanity or natural mental infirmity, without more,

is sufficient to rebut the presumption of soundness of mind.

2.

How may the evidential burden of proof of insanity which lies on the person

pleading the defence of insanity be discharged.

3.

What facts must an accused person establish in order to succeed in his defence

of insanity.

4.

What is the extent of the criminal liability of an accused person suffering from

insane delusion.

5.

What is the distinction between insanity/natural infirmity and delusions.

6.

Whether it is possible in law to establish the defence of insanity without first

proving either mental disease or natural mental infirmity.

7.

Where an accused person relies on the defence of delusions, is it sufficient for

him to merely show that he had suffered from some mental disease which may

have induced delusions on him, and on who does that difficult onus of proof of

delusion lie.

8.

What is the evidential weight of the testimony of an accused person as to his own

insanity.

9.

Whether an unreliable piece of evidence can still be relevant evidence in the case

in which it is adduced.

10.

Whether a court can properly reject the testimony of a witness on the ground that

such a witness had been suborned where there is no evidence of such

subornment.

11.

Whether the testimony of an expert can be relevant evidence within the meaning

of section 64 of the Evidence Act, where such expert gives an opinion without

stating the grounds on which such an opinion is based.

12.

Where a trial court had come to the right conclusion in a case before it, albeit for

the wrong reasons, whether an appellate court, rejecting those reasons, can

affirm the decision on the proper reasons.

FACTS:

On the 28th day of June, 1985, the appellant shot and killed one Reuben Oken-

pa at Umuosu - Nsulu, in the Isiala Ngwa Judicial Division of Imo State. The de-

ceased who was oh that fateful day, driving a motor vehicle in the company of a lady,

had, on seeing the appellant standing by the road, pulled over, meaning to give the

latter a ride as both were kinsmen and friends. The appellant who was weilding a

double barrelled gun shot him instead. Before he died, the deceased exclaimed:

"my brother you have killed me". The appellant then drew closer to the car, took a

peep inside, and having satisfied himself that the appellant was dead, snorted: "yes!".

He then scared away the crowd which had converged at the scene of crime by

pointing the gun at them. That done, he returned to his house.

He was arrested on the same day and the double barrelled gun recovered from

him. When the police first confronted him with the allegation that he had killed the

deceased, he said nothing. He recorded a statement subsequently in which he made

no allusions to the killing. However, on the 3rd day of November, 1982, he made an

additional statement in which he admitted that he had killed the deceased because,

the latter had provoked him by making fun of him for not having money. He also al-

leged that the deceased had seduced his wife. At his trial however, he gave evidence

in which he denied that he had killed the deceased. He claimed that he suffered from

a mental disease which often deprived him of the capacity to remember later, what-

ever he may have done during an attack. His wife (DW2) also testified to his mental

disease, claiming that the appellant had received mental treatment at a native doc-

tors and in a prayer house. But when the investigating police officer had requested

to be taken to the native doctor and to the prayer house, she had refused to do so.

Neither the native doctor nor anybody from the prayer house was called as witness.

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