ONUOHA V. THE STATE

Pages175-191
ONUOHA V. THE STATE
175
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ONUOHA V. THE STATE
THEOPHILUS ONUOHA
V
10 THE STATE
SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
CRAIG,
J.S.C.
ESO,
J.S.C.
15
KARIBI-WHYTE,
J.S.C.
OPUTA,
J.S.C.
AGBAJE,
J.S.C.
1st July, 1988.
APPELLANT
RESPONDENT
SUIT NO. SC 8/1988
Criminal Law - Indictment for breach of trust - What prosecution must prove, Sections 311
(a) 315, Penal Code, Northern Nigeria.
Criminal Procedure - Judgments - Section 269(1) of the Criminal procedure Code -
Compliance with - Whether setting a rigid pattern for judgment writing - Helpful hints
on the art of judgment writing - Summing up in jury and non jury trials - Appeals -
Concurrent findings by lower courts - Attitude of appellate court - Failure to evaluate
evidence by lower court - Effect on appeal.
Evidence - Extra-judicial statements - Voluntariness - Admissibility - Voir dire - Evidence
of voluntariness.
Interpretation and Construction - Section 269(1) C.P.0 - Judicial interpretation of.
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ISSUES:
1.
What would constitute a sufficient compliance with the provisions of section
269(1) of the C.P.C. in writing a judgment.
2.
What must the prosecution establish in an indictment for criminal breact of trust
in order to prove its case.
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3. What is the policy attitude of the Supreme Court to the concurrent findings of
lower courts.
4. Where an extra-judicial statement is found to have been voluntary although the
maker refutes its voluntariness at trial, can such a belated denial can render it
inadmissible.
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5. Whether an appellate court will entertain and pronounce upon an issue not raised
by an appellant in his briefs of argument but which was canvassed during oral
elaboration at hearing.
6. Whether section 269(1) of the C.P.C. lays down a rigid order or pattern that must
be followed for a judgment written thereunder to be valid.
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7. What is the proper construction of section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
8. When will an appellate court interfer with the judgment of a trial court of
non-compliance with it section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES
[1988] 2 N.S.C.C.
FACTS:
The appellant was convicted as charged by an Ilorin High Court (Kwara State)
on an indictment for Criminal breach of trust contra section 311 of the Penal Code
and punishable under Section 315 of the same. A very Senior Police officer, the ap-
pellant was the commandant of the Police training School, Ilorin, Kwara State. The
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indictment related the sum of one hundred and thirty thousand, three hundred and
eighty naira (N130,380.00) which had been entrusted to the appellant by the Federal
Government for onward transmission to the students as refunds for deductions from
their salaries. These deductions were made before the Federal Government intro-
duced free feeding for all recruits.
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The appellant then utilised the sum of sixty-seven thousand, eight naira
(N67,008.00) for his own purposes in violation of the trust which had been reposed
an him as a public officer. When he was arrested on charges of a criminal breach
of trust, he made a statement to the Police in which he admitted liability for the mis-
sing sum and undertook to replace the money. During the trial, the prosecution led
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evidence to show that the appellant had retained the money on the false pretext that
it was to be used to pay off certain debts which the school owed to some food con-
tractors. The contractors denied that they were owed any money by the school on
the witness box. There was evidence that the appellant had tried unsuccessfully to
persuade two of the student-recruits who had given evidence to perjure themselves
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in saying that what they had received as refunds of their monies was all that was due
to them. After he had satisfied himself that the appellant's statement admitting lia-
bility was voluntary and on the totality of the evidence, the trial judge convicted the
appellant, and sentenced him to five years imprisonment. The appellant appealed
to the Court of Appeal where his major complaint was that the trial court did not com-
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ply with section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which requires that every
judgment shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon
and the reasons for the decision and shall be dated and signed or sealed by the
judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it. He also complained against an
order for forfeiture which the trial court had made. Allowing the appeal against the
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order of forfeiture, the Court of Appeal dismissed the rest of the appeal and the ap-
pellant appealed further to the Supreme Court on much the same grounds of appeal
as he had canvassed at the Court of Appeal. He argued that in affirming the judg-
ment of the trial Court, the Court of Appeal had failed to hold (1) that the judgment
did not accord with section 269(1) of the C.P.C., and (2) the judgment of the trial
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court was unreasonable, unwarranted and could not be supported having regard to
the evidence. In his briefs of argument however, the appellant said nothing as touch-
ing his ground of appeal complaining against sentence.
HELD:
1. That as to the complaint that the trial court had drawn conclusions before he
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had finished reviewing the cases of both parties, by which reason, the appellant
contends, the trial judge had not complied with section 269(1) of the C.P.C. and
thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice, the writing of a judgment is an art
in itself and there are more than one way of going about it. It is possible to
have
as many variations as there are judges. What is essential is that a judge should
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show a clear understanding of the facts in the case, of the issues involved, the
law applicable and from all these, draw the right conclusions and make a correct
finding on the evidence before him. The judgment under review shows that the
learned trial judge had adequately set out the facts in the case and had made
correct findings from those facts. For in the instant case, the real point at issue
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was whether there had been a criminal breach of trust which was what the
prosecution was expected to prove. The appellant himself made the
prosecution's task eminently easy by admitting the relevant facts.

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