STITCH V. A-G. FEDERATION & ORS.

Pages1389-1415
STITCH V. A-G. FEDERATION & ORS.
1389
STITCH V. A-G. FEDERATION & ORS.
5
MARGARET CHINYERE STITCH
APPELLANT
V
10 1. A-G. OF FEDERATION
2.
BOARD OF CUSTOMS & EXCISE
RESPONDENTS
3.
A-G., OGUN STATE
JOINED BY ORDER OF COURT
4.
O.O. ONIFADE
15
SUIT NO. SC 88/1985
SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
ESO,
J.S.0
ANIAGOLU,
J.S.0
UWAIS,
J.S.C.
20
COKER,
J.S.0
KARIBI-WHYTE,
J.S.0
12th December, 1986
Administrative Law - Public Authorities - Discretional)) Power of - Courts'
25
Jurisdiction to intervene where exercised arbitrarily or improperly - Issuance of
car Import Licences suspended by Minister of Commerce in contemplation of
new order by Finance Minister increasing rate of customs duties from 33
1/3% to 500% advalorem - Plaintiff's car subject at time of importation to
duty at lower rate but licence delayed until after promulgation of new order
30
-
Duty payable by her consequently assessed at higher rate - Effect - Right
of plaintiff, a Nigerian citizen to rely on government's declared existing policy
- Suspension of issuance of licence to plaintiff and additional levy an improper
exercise of Minister's discretion - Minister's powers in regard to licences
statutorily limited to refusal, revocation and modification of Licences, no
35
responsibility conferred on him for fiscal matters - Release of car in specie to
plaintiff rendered impossible - Plaintiff's 3rd claim being in detinue, plaintiff
entitled to value of similar car in good condition from 1st and 2nd respondents
as tortfeasors.
40
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the Courts may intervene where Public Authorities exercise their
discretionary powers arbitrarily or improperly.
2.
What is the basic distinction between a cause of action in conversion and a
cause of action in detinue?
45
3. What is the measure of damages available to an aggrieved party in an action
for detinue.
FACTS:
The plaintiff had bought a used 1976 model Mercedes Benz 280 Saloon car
while in Germany, and shipped it to Nigeria on the 22nd February 1982. The car
50
arrived at the Lagos Harbour on the 3rd of April 1982. The plaintiff's car was sub-
ject at the time of importation to duty at the rate of 33 1/3% and she fulfilled all laid
down conditions for issuance of import licence before applying for a licence. The
plaintiff was entitled under normal Ministry procedure to expect the issue of a
Licence within a few days of her application, but the issuing of Licences was sus-
1390
NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES
[1986] 2 N.S.C.C.
pended and her licence was delayed for about 2 weeks until after the promulga-
tion of a new order which assessed the duty payable by her, at the rate of 500%.
On the basis of 33 1/3%, the duty payable by the plaintiff was N1,449.22 whilst on
the basis of 500% the duty payable was N14,500.00. The plaintiff refused to pay
this new amount arguing that the car had arrived in the country before the new
5
order increasing the rate of duty payable was made. She paid the Board of Cus-
toms N1,449.22, and they issued a receipt for this sum, but refused to release the
car until the balance of the full 500% duty charged was paid. The plaintiff thus in-
stituted an action against the defendants claiming - a declaration that the suspen-
sion of issuance of licences was unlawfully calculated to subject her car to the new
10
order; a declaration that she was liable to pay duty at the rate payable prior to the
New Order and; the release of her car to her on payment at that rate.
The High Court, in its judgment found against the plaintiff holding that the duty
on the car must be the amount which according to the new law was payable on
the day payment was tendered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's appeal to the Court
15
of Appeal was also dismissed whereupon she further appealed to the Supreme
Court.
During the proceedings, it was revealed that the car in dispute had been sold
by the Port Commandant of Tin Can Island Port, Lagos to the Ogun State Govern-
ment who had also sold it to one Mr. Onifade, as a result of which Mr. Onifade
20
and the Attorney- General of Ogun State were joined as parties to the suit.
The appellant contended that the Ministry of Commerce did not have the power
to suspend the issue of an import licence to the appellant and that the exercise by
the Ministry of such a power to suspend was arbitrary in the circumstances.
HELD:
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1.
The contention of the respondents that the Minister of Commerce under Section
3 of the Finance Act, 1981 had unfettered power to grant or refuse import
licences with or without assigning reasons, is not true in law. The discretionary
power of the Minister under section 3 of the Finance Act, 1981 is clearly within
the reviewable jurisdiction of the courts. Whether the Minister failed to
30
exercised his discretion; or refused to exercise his discretion; or misused the
discretionary power, it being a principle established by the courts that once a
prima facie
case of misuse of power has been established, it would be open
to the courts to infer that the Minister acted unlawfully, whether or nor he
supplied a justification.
35
2.
It was an improper exercise of the Minister's discretionary power for him to
suspend the issue of a licence to the appellant when the duty payable was
331/3% in order that the appellant might be made to pay at a later date, duty
charged at the rate of 500%. It was unjust and retrospectively punitive, and the
legislature had not given the Minister authority to levy that amount from the
40
appellant. The appellant is thus entitled to the declarations sought by her.
3.
The release of the appellant's car to her has been rendered impossible by its
sale to the 3rd and 4th respondents and its subsequent cannibalization by the
latter, thus she is entitled to receive from the 1st and 2nd respondents an amount
which will buy her a second-hand Mercedes Benz 280 Saloon car with all the
45
accessories contained therein when she imported hers.
4.
A cause of action in conversion is a sinale wrongful act and the cause of action
accrues at the date of the conversion. A cause of action in detinue however is
a continuing cause of action which accrues at the date of the wrongful refusal
to deliver up the goods and continues until delivery up the goods or judgment
50
in the action for detinue. The appellant's cause of action in the instant case was
based on detinue and not conversion, which took place long after the action
had been instituted and the decision of the trial court given.
5.

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