Police

Pages831-848
POLICE
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION OF POLICE
2101. Distinction between executive and administrative actions of police.
“He was of the view that by virtue of the provisions of Sections 24 and 29 of the
Police Act Cap. 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 relating to police pow-
ers of arrest and detention respectively, the police carried out their statutory function
and not an administrative action. I strongly feel that the trial Judge goofed in the
main. The police executed their statutory duties under the Police Act They carried
out an executive action or decision as a Federal Government Agency. It was clearly
erroneous to side track the executive action taken by the police. It should be stated
that if the police arrest and detain a suspect, such is an exercise of executive action
as imbued by the Police Act. In contra distinction, if the police dismiss one of their
men in line with their regulation, such can be described as an administrative action.”
- Per Fabiyi, J.C.A in U.T.B (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ukpabia Suit No. CA/E/19/99; (2000) 8
N.W.L.R. (Pt. 670) 570 at 579.
(2) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION
2102. Discretion of the police to investigate allegation of crime.
(1) “But I can see nothing in Section 4 of the Police Act, which denies them of any
discretion whether or not to investigate any particular allegation, or when they decide
to investigate to do so to it’s logical conclusion, The need to execise a discretion in
such a matter may arise from a variety of reasons or circumstances, particularly
having regard to the nature of the offence, the resources available, the time and
trouble involved and the ultimate end-result. It may well be a question of balancing
options as well as weighing what is really in the public interest. It is inconceivable that
such wide powers and duties of the police must be exercised and performed without
any discretion left to responsible police operatives.” - Per Uwaifo, J.S.C. in Fawehinmi
v. I.G.P. Suit No. S.C. 201/2000; (2002) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 767) 606 at 670-671.
(2) “There is no doubt in my mind that the duty of the police under section 4 above
cannot be categorized as being ministerial and as such there is an element of discre-
tion or independent judgment available in it. See: Shitta Bey v. Federal Civil Service
Commission (1981) 1 S.C. 40. Looking closely at the contents of Exhibit GF7, the
respondents may have used them as reason for not embarking on the investigation:
whether that was good reason having regard to their duty under Section 4 of the
Police Act has been fully discussed in the leading judgment.
I do not intend to say more on that other than to agree that police duty under
Section 4 of the Police Act and the duty of the House of Assembly under Section 188
of the 1999 Constitution are mutually exclusive. But the point must be made that the
police have a discretion, in appropriate circumstances in the way they carry out their
duty. When so exercised, it is only in very obvious and exceptional circumstances
that the Court may interfere with their discretion.” - Per Kalgo, J.S.C. in Fawehinmi
v. I.G.P. & Ors. Suit No. S.C. 201/2000; (2002) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 767) 606 at 670.
831
Administrative and executive action of police Paras. 2101,2102
Paras. 2102,2103 Vol. 16 : POLICE 832
(3) “Since the doubt lingers from the cross-examination of P.W.3 that either the
deceased or the appellant could have caused the death, the doubt must be resolved in
favour of the appellant. It is pertinent to mention that the investigation of this case by
the police, that is P.W.1, leaves much to be desired. The accused said in his statement
Exhibit ‘A’ that his co-tenant helped him together with the taxi driver to carry the
deceased to the taxi. Attempt to trace the co-tenant was half-heartedly carried out.
The mother of the so-called co-tenant stayed in the same house as the appellant and
she said that the “co-tenant” lived elsewhere and used to visit her only. No further
effort was made by the police to trace him. Again the appellant mentioned Johnbull in
the same statement. No serious investigation about this was conducted to find out if
he existed; and if so, whether he issued patient’s registration card to the appellant.
It seems also the appellant was not asked by the police to produce the card,
which he said was issued to him by Johnbull, if at all. The taxi driver concerned could
have been traced too by the police to confirm if deceased was alive when she was
put in his taxi but no evidence was given if this was done. All these are necessary
steps, which ought to have been taken if the prosecution were to prove their case
against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In other words the investigation of the
case was shoddy and incomplete. Any defence put, up by an accused person what-
soever whether stupid or spurious must be investigated thoroughly in order to render
it false or unlikely. It is when this happens that the trial Court will be able to reject it.”
- Per Uwais, C.J.N. in Aigbadion v. State Suit No. S.C. 56/1999; (2000) 7 N.W.L.R.
(Pt. 666) 686 at 700.
(4) “The police investigation was unsatisfactory. It exhibited lack of commitment and
facilitated the escape of the real perpetrators of the deceased’s untimely death. The
deceased was generally known to be mentally deranged, aggressive and pugnacious
but was entitled to her life.” - Per Ndoma-Egba, J.C.A. in Kalu v. State Suit No.
CA/PH/96/88; (1993) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 279) 20 at 33.
(5) “The appellant is no doubt right in his argument that by virtue of the fact that
Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution recognises one police force for Nigeria and
the said police are given a duty under Section 4 of the Police Act [now in Cap. 359],
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 to prevent and detect crime, apprehend
offenders, preserve law and order, protect lives and property and enforce all laws
and regulations with which they are directly charged, and that it is an important
statutory duty which they owe to the generality of Nigerians and all other persons
lawfully living within Nigeria. It follows that in their duty to detect crime, allegations
of the crime committed by any person should normally be investigated by the police.”
- Per Uwaifo, J.S.C. in Fawehinmi v. I.G.P. Suit No. S.C. 201/2000; (2002) 7 N.W.L.R.
(Pt. 767) 606 at 670.
2103. Police privilege to decline to disclose informant.
“Indeed, the police may decline to disclose their informants, if a responsible officer
appears in Court to object to its disclosure.” - Per Ndoma-Egba, J.C.A. in Ahamba.
v. State (1992) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 242) 450 at 458 - 459.

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