OJO V. FALAIYE

• Pages: 150-152

150

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OJO V. FALAIYE.

mind is sufficiently blameworthy in the eyes of the law to require that the killing

should be punished by death.

With all respect for the Chief Justice, we do not consider that the appellant can

be said to have acted in a cruel manner in the sense indicated, or that the forcity

with which he acted was, having regard to his cultural background and station in

life, sufficiently unusual not to be attributable merely to the heat of passion. In the

circumstances we substitute a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide not punish-

able with death, an offence punishable under section 224 of the Penal Code, for

the verdit found by the Chief Justice, and we pass a sentence of seven years' im-

prisonment.

Appeal allowed and conviction of

culpable Homicide not punishable

with Death substituted.

OA) V. FALAIYE.

SAMUEL OLUSHOLA OJO

V

1.

W.J. FALAIYE

2.

J.A. 1BUJE

FEDERAL SUPREME COURT.

BRETT,

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F.J.

UNSWORTH,

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F.J.

TAYLOR,

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F.J.

8th June, 1961

APPELLANT

RESPONDENTS

SUIT NO.FSC 104/1961

Constitutional Law - Election Petition - Elections (House of Representatives)

Regulation 1958 - Pleading

Practice and Procedure - Practice and Procedure - Application by Petitioner to

Court to inquire into new issues after Petitioner's case closed - Federal

Legislative Houses (Disputed Seats) Regulation, 1959, Regulation 30 - Discretion

of Court - Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954 s.10 (1)(d).

ISSUE:

Whether a petitioner who has closed his case can be allowed to use answers

elicited in cross-examination as an excuse for calling additional evidence in

rebuttal.

FACTS:

The Appellant in his petition to the High Court prayed for a determination that

the election of the Respondent, Falaiye, in December 1959, to the House of Rep-

resentatives for Ondo North- East was void. The petition alleged instances of cor-

rupt practices. The evidence called by the Petitioner was designed to substantiate

those allegations.

After the close of petitioner's case, a witness was called for the 1st respondent

after which the respondent himself gave evidence. He stated that he ceased to be

such in November 1959. After four more witnesses had been called on behalf of

the First Respondent, the Petitioner's Counsel asked the Court to exercise its

powers of inquiry under the Legislative Houses (Disputed Seats) Regulations,