MENIRU & ORS V. IGWE & ANOR

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NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES
[1963] N.S.C.C.
MENIRU & ORS V. IGWE & ANOR
MADAM PATEGC MENIRU & 10 ORS.
APPELLANTS
V
1.
CLETUS IGWE
2.
D'ALBERTO & BOGIALLA LTD
RESPONDENTS
SUIT NO. FSC 339/1962
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT.
ADEMOLA,
C.J.F.
BRETT,
F.J.
TAYLOR,
F.J.
4th January, 1963.
Tort - Claim for damages suffered in consequence of negligent driving of employee
of Company against both employee and Company - Negligence - Vicarious
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liability - Action outside scope of employment of employee - Carrying passenger
in motor vehicle - Prohibition - Condition precedent - Consent from appropriate
authority - Conditional prohibition - Effect.
ISSUES:
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1.
Under what circumstances will a company be held vicariously liable for the
negligence done by its employee?
2.
When can an employee be said to be acting outside the "scope of his
employment"?
FACTS:
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The plaintiff's husband, now deceased was a contractor who supplied build-
ing materials to the 2nd defendants, amongst others. The deceased was engaged
in blasting operations at a quarry at Minna on the 15th January, 1959. At the con-
clusion of his work, he travelled in a Fiat station wagon owned by the 2nd defend-
ant, but driven by the 1st defendant from Minna to Zungeru. An accident took place
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on the Minna - Zungeru Road as a result of which the deceased died.
The plaintiffs, the first of whom was the wife of the deceased, sued the defend-
ants jointly and severally for the sum of £20,000 as damages suffered by them in
consequence of the negligent driving by the 1st defendant of the 2nd defendant's
vehicle which caused the death of the deceased.
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The trial Judge held that the 1st defendant was negligent and therefore liable,
but found that liability for the consequences of the accident could not be vicari-
ously attributed to the 2nd defendant since the 1st defendant was acting outside
the scope of his authority when the accident occured.
On appeal, it was contended for the appellant that the deceased was carried
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in the vehicle to the express knowledge of the 2nd defendant and as such they
could not rely on any secret prohibition to the 1st defendant that he should not
carry passengers. Also that at the time of the accident the 1st respondent was not
acting outside the scope of his employment.
HELD:
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1. That a prohibition against carrying passengers though subject to a proviso that
this can be done only by the consent of the necessary authority, cannot be said
to apply only within the sphere of employment, thus the conduct of the driver
was outside his scope of employment and could only have been brought within
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