Land Law

Pages1-957
1
Abandoned property Paras. 1,2
LAND LAW
(1) ABANDONED PROPERTY
1. Application of the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict
No. 8 1966 Laws of Rivers State.
“There was evidence that the plaintiff hailed from Njikoka in Anambra. State and
that he had to flee Port-Harcourt during the war. He is therefore a non-indigene of
Rivers State. Now what about the defendant, what State does he come from? The
Deed of Conveyance Exhibit Q, tendered by him described him as….”Claudius
Daumoru Olali…..native (of Kulo town in Ogbia Local Government District of the
Brass Local Government Authority Area Rivers State of Nigeria (hereinafter called
purchaser ………………..” The defendant is therefore an indigene of Rivers State
and since he did not leave the State during the Civil war, nor abandon any property at
the relevant period, the Abandoned Property Edict 1969 would not apply to him. But
this does not mean that the defendant has no rights under the Edict, for under Section
13, he may claim ownership of any abandoned property and prevent the Abandoned
Property Authority from paying the accumulated rents it had collected to the sup-
posed owner.” – Per Craig, J.S.C. in Olale v. Ekwelendu Suit No. S.C. 54/1988;
(1989) 20 N.S.C.C. (Pt. III) 118 at 153; (1989) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 115) 326 at 342.
2. Burden on party claiming abandoned property was sold to him.
“The sheer audacity in counsel’s pronouncements drove me timorously to peek into
Section 1(1) of the Abandoned Properties Decree, No. 90 of 1979 (Now Abandoned
Properties Act, Cap. 1 Laws of the Federation, 1990) whence counsel derived the
clout to mortify the poor trial Judge so. It provides: - “1(1) Every sale or disposition of
abandoned properties conducted by the Abandoned Properties Implementation Com-
mittee (hereafter in this Act referred to as “the Committee’) set up by the Federal
Government shall be deemed to have been lawful and properly made and any instru-
ment issued by the committee which purports to convey any estate or interest in land,
shall be deemed to have been validly issued and shall have effect accordingly to its
tenor or intendment.”
Speaking for myself, I see nothing in this provision indicating that any com-
mittee had in fact been set up under it. It does not set up any committee. It merely
seeks to validate any sale done by a committee that may be set up by the Federal
Government, thereby indicating that the Federal Government has power to set up
one. Having power to set up a committee is a matter of law to be gleaned from the
provisions of the law. Whether that power has been exercised is clearly a matter of
fact to be determined on evidence. If one accepts the learned counsel’s arguments,
Paras. 2-4 Vol. 14: LAND LAW 2
one would be paving the way for anarchy. It would mean that any group of hoodlums
could get together claiming to have been constituted by the Federal Government into
the Abandoned Property Implementation Committee. They could then set about
terrorising the land since no Court could even inquire into whether or not they had
been constituted as they claimed. With all due respect to learned counsel, I cannot
accept his argument. For the appellant to cover the committee that purportedly of-
fered the plaintiff’s property for sale to him with the protection afforded by Section
1(1) of Cap. 1 of 1990, he must show by admissible evidence that that Committee
had in fact been set up by the Federal Government.” - Per Ikongbeh, J.C.A. in
Icentebe v. Isangedighi Suit No. CA/PH/147/90; (2002) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 768) 134
at 146-147.
3. Can a person desert his property without the intention to desert it?
“Another question which could be asked on this issue is – can a person desert his
property without the intention to desert it? Can I abandon my property without the
intention to abandon it? I concede that in the interpretation of statutes, a person’s
intention is immaterial. But intention could be of assistance in determining whether
there was a desertion or abandonment of the property. Two elements, in my view, are
necessary in act of desertion or abandonment. There must be animus desertendi
and the act of desertion. Both the intention and the act constitute desertion. Such
elements are not present in the present case.” – Per Ubaezomu, J.C.A. in
Chukwuogor v. A-G. Cross Rivers State Suit No. CA/E/30/93; (1998) 1. N.W.L.R.
(Pt. 534) 375 at 409 – 410.
4. Condition for validity of sale of abandoned property.
(1) “From the pleadings and evidence the sale was made by “Director, Committee on
Government Properties” on behalf of Rivers State Government and not by any “Aban-
doned Properties Implementation Committee” set up by the Federal Government
under Abandoned Properties Act, 1990. It followed therefore that the sale did not
receive any protection under Section 1(1) thereof.” - Per Ogebe, J.C.A. in Kentebe
v. Isangedighi Suit No. CA/PH/147/90; (2002) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 768) 134 at 151.
(2) “On whether the trial Court had no jurisdiction because of Section 1(1) of Cap. 1
of 1990, the 2nd defendant himself proved beyond any shadow of doubt that the
interest he purportedly acquired in the plaintiff’s property did not come to him from
the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee. As I showed earlier regard-
ing Exhs. E, F and F1, the offer made to him by the committee lapsed because he did
not meet its deadline given to him by the committee and the allocation was expressly
nullified by the very president of the committee that made it. How can we close our
eyes to this piece of evidence that the 2nd defendant himself placed before Court and
accept his contention that the committee sold the property to him?” - Per Ikongbeh,
J.C.A. in Icentebe v. Isangedighi Suit No. CA/PH/147/90; (2002) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt.
768) 134 at 147-148.
3 Abandoned property Paras. 4-6
(3) “With all due respect to learned counsel, I cannot accept his argument. For the
appellant to cover the committee that purportedly offered the plaintiff’s property for
sale to him with the protection afforded by Section 1(1) of Cap. 1 of 1990, he must
show by admissible evidence that that committee had in fact been set up by the
Federal Government. As there had been no such showing, the learned trial Judge
was justified in making the observation complained of in the second issue for deter-
mination.” - Per Ikongbeh, J.C.A. in Kentebe v. Isangedighi Suit No. CA/PH/147/
90; (2002) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 768) 134 at 147.
5. Does the nullification of the Rivers State Lands (Cancellation of Leases)
Edict No. 15 of 1972 by a Supreme Court apply ipso facto to every case?
“Indeed the learned trial Judge found as a fact that the plaintiff did not challenge the
validity of the Edict. At page 168 he said: - “It is to be noted that the plaintiff did not
challenge the cancellation Edict.” I must point out that there has been no appeal
against this finding. It will be seen that it is not correct to state that the validity of the
Edict was directly in issue in the instant case. It is also not correct to say that the
learned trial Judge held that the Edict was null and void. He did not. This case is on all
fours with the case of Abaye v. Ofili (supra). In the instant case, the plaintiff’s lease
of the land in question was cancelled by the Rivers State Land (Cancellation of
Leases) Edict, 1972 and the property was later sold and re-conveyed to the 1st
defendant by the 2nd defendant under and by virtue of a conveyance registered as
No. 18 at page 78 in Vol. 72 in the Lands Registry, Port-Harcourt. This Action was
taken before 3rd December 1982 when the decision in Peenok’s case was given. In
other words, the lease of the plaintiff was cancelled and the land was re-conveyed to
the 1st defendant, Sunday Abere while Edicts Nos. 15 and 17 of 1972 were still valid
and subsisting. The consequence of this is that the declaration by the Supreme Court
in 1982 that the Edict of 1972 was null, void and unConstitutional did not affect the
previous operation of the Edict or anything done or suffered under the Edict. That
declaration also did not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or
incurred under the 1972 Edict. Put simply, the sale of the property in question under
the Edict of 1972 remains valid.” - Per Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. in P.N. Uddoh Trad.
Co. Ltd. v. Abere Suit No. CA/PH/115/93; (1996) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 467) 479 at 494-
495.
6. Need for approval of transaction by the Military Governor under S. 15 of
the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict 1969.
Section 15 of the Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict 1969 pro-
vides that: - Any transaction entered into after 27th day of May, 1997 relating to the
sale, lease, mortgage or disposal of any abandoned property or of any interest therein,
shall be null and void unless such transaction is approved by the Military Governor
within six months after the commencement of this Edict. The defendant admitted in

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