Interpretation of Statutes

• Pages: 6-549

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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES.

ABIA STATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT (THIRD AMENDMENT) LAW, 2004.

Purport and effect of sections 4 and 5 of the Abia State Local Government (Third

Amendment) Law, 2004. “I have read a copy of the law in question. It is the Abia State Local

Government (Third Amendment) Law, 2004. Sections 4 and 5 states is set out below: “4.

Section 19(3) of the Principal Law is hereby amended to read as follows: Subject to the

provisions of sub-section 1 of this section, the elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Local

Government Councils shall vacate their offices at the expiration of a period of 2 (two) years,

commencing from the date when: (a) in the case of a person first elected as Chairman or Vice-

Chairman under this law, he took the oath of allegiance and the oath of office or (b) the person

last elected to that office took the oathof allegiance and the oath of office or would but for

death have taken such oaths. 5. Section 25 of the Principal Law is hereby amended to include

sub-section 3 which reads as follows: Subject to the provision of sub-sections, 1 & 2 of the

section, the elected councilors of the Local Government Councils shall vacate their offices at

the expiration of a period of 2 (two) years, commencing from the date when: (a) in the case of

a person first elected as Councilor under this law, he took the oath of allegiance and or the oath

of office; or (b) the person last elected to that office took the oath of allegiance and the oath of

office or would but for his death have taken such oaths.” As we know, an amendment enures

into the principal Act or Law as in this case. The law amends S. 19(3) of the Abia State Local

Government Law, 1999 by reducing the tenure of Local Government Chairmen from three to

two years. S. 25 amends the tenure of elected councilors from 3 years to 2 years. Subsection

(b) of both sections specifically made the legislation applicable to the then current holders of

the office. The current holders of the office at the time the law came into effect counting from

the day they were sworn in would have two years tenure even if they were sworn in before the

law took effect. Thus, there was a clear intention by the legislature to make the law applicable

to persons who may have been sworn in by the previous legislation which provided for three

year tenure thus abrogating existing vested rights in respect of persons sworn in under the

previous law.” – Per Ogunwumiju, J.C.A., in Eze v. Gov., Abia State Suit No.

CA/PH/626/2008; (2010) 15 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1216) 324 at 359 - 360.

ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES LAWS.

Construction of section 4(2) of Administration of Estates Law of Lagos State. “The text

“shall not be made without the concurrence therein of all such representatives” should be

accorded its clear literal construction. Concur means “to agree”. And concurrence simply

means agreement. In my view, therefore, the provision simply means that where there are two

or more personal representatives a conveyance of real estate under this law shall not be made

without the agreement of all such representatives. The word“concurrence” in the context is not

synonymous with the word execution. Thus, a conveyance can, under section 4(2) of the

Administration of Estates Laws, Cap. 3, Laws of Lagos State, be validly executed by one of

two or more personal representative provided it is so executed and signed with the concurrence

or agreement of such other personal representatives. In the present case therefore, the 1st

defendant who is 3rd respondent, Mrs. Cecilia Nkemdili Ibekwe being one of the executrixes

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of the estate of the late Justice Daniel Ibekwe can, acting alone, validly execute an agreement

for the sale of the subject property provided it is so done with the concurrence or consent of

the second Executrix Maureen Umeadi Ibekwe. And there is no evidence that the said Maure en

Umeadi Ibekwe did not concur or agree.” – Per Tabai, J.S.C., in Ohiaeri v. Yussuf Suit No.

S.C. 35/2004; (2009) 6 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1137) 207 at 226 - 227.

Inconsistency of section 120(1)(b) of the Administration and Succession (Estate of

Deceased Persons’) Law of Anambra State, 1991 with section 42(1)(a) of 1999

Constitution.“Section 120(1) (b) of the Administration and Succession (Estate of Deceased

Persons’) Law of Anambra State, 1991 no doubt, to the extent that it discriminates or

dichotomizes between male and female intestate spouses is inconsistent with section 42(1)(a)

of the 1999 Laws and to the extent of such inconsistency ought to be void. This is because by

providing that only one third of the estate of the intestate shall go to “the surviving spouse

whose interest shall be absolute in the case of a husband or for her life or until her remarriage

(which ever first occurs) in the case of a wife,” the widow is put under great disadvantage

particularly in the case of this appellant who had toiled all these years with her husband and

invested her life savings in building the estate now in dispute only for her to be entitled only to

a life interest of one third of the estate and the bulk of the residue of two thirds of the estate

shall devolve on the children of an adulterer who will now enjoysame absolutely. Definitely,

since the Anambra State Succession Law did not envisage this unwholesome scenario, this

Court ought to seek for the aid of Equity and other legislations that will ameliorate the hardship

of the provisions of Section 120(1)(b) of the Administration and Succession (Estate of

Deceased Persons’) Law, Cap. 4, Laws of Anambra State, 1991 in order to do justice to a

childless widow like the appellant.” – PerAgube, J.C.A., in Okonkwo v. Okonkwo Suit No.

CA/E/358/07; (2014) 17 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1435) 18 at 54.

Meaning of “concurrence” in section 4(2), Administration of Estates Law of Lagos State.

“I am of the view that the expression “concurrence therein” appearing in subsection 4(2) of the

Administration of Estates Law Cap. 2, Laws of Lagos State (supra) means the agreement or

consent of all the personal representatives in the conveyance of the real estate of the de ceased.”

– Per Edozie, J.S.C., in Ibrahim v. Ojomo Suit No. S.C. 249/2000; (2004) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 862)

89 at 108.

Rationale for substitution of Regional Laws for English statutes in Western Region of

Nigeria. “The policy of substitution of Regional Laws for statutes of general application in

force in England on 1st January, 1900 was best described in the preface to the Laws of Western

Region of Nigeria, 1959 as follows: “This policy included the substitution ofRegional Laws

for such of those statutes of general application in force in England on 1st January, 1900, and

as such in force in the Region, as were deemed appropriate to the present circumstances of the

Region and dealt with as matters within the competence of its legislature. Bills to give effect

to this policy were prepared by the Commissioner and were enacted for inclusion in the present

edition of the Laws of the Region.” – Per Ayoola, J.S.C., in Salubi v. Nwariaku Suit No. S.C.

120/1997; (2003) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 819) 426 at 450.

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Sources of Administration of Estates Law. “In substituting Regional Laws for those of such

English statutes a lot was borrowed from English statutes more recent than 1900. In several

cases the substituted Regional Laws were, indeed, wholesale transplantation of the then current

English statutes with minor modifications. The sources of several of the provisions of the

Administration of Estates Law, both of the former Western Region of Nigeria and of the former

Bendel State were the provisions of the English Administration of Estates Act, 1925 and of

English statutes later than 1925 amending or adding to them.” – Per Ayoola, J.S.C., in Salubi

v. Nwariaku Suit No. S.C. 120/1997; (2003) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 819) 426 at 450.

Substitution of Regional Laws for English statutes in Western Region of Nigeria. “It is a

matter of common knowledge that Western Region of Nigeria out of which the then Mid-West

State (which was later named Bendel State of Nigeria) was carved enacted its Administration

of Estates Law in 1959 and that that Region by a deliberate and forward looking policy of

modernizing its statute laws and making it easily accessible to the people ceased to apply

statutes of general application in force in England on 1st January, 1900 but, rather, received

the provisions of several enactments of England into its legal system by transplanting and

domesticating such provisions by its own enactment.” – Per Ayoola, J.S.C., in Salubi v.

Nwariaku Suit No. S.C. 120/1997; (2003) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 819) 426 at 450.

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

Effect of special rules made to compliment general rules for administrative bodies.

“Where there is a general provision such as in the Public Service Rules on procedure to conduct

an affair and another rule allows for special rules to be enacted to compliment as peculiar to an

institution, the special rules cannot be ignored. The institution can rely on the special rules. In

the instant appeal, the Public Service Rule 030307 provides a 60 day limitation period within

which to conclude disciplinary action without any mandatory sanction. The learned trial Judge

rightly found so in construction of paragraph 0300307 however the lower Court erred when in

a twist he held that non-compliance amounted to breach of respondent’s fundamental right to

fair hearing whichis not in consonant with his earlier finding on whether the provision is

mandatory. The Federal Judicial Service Commission Rules stipulates that disciplinary action

be determined within a reasonable time. It is my view that the Special Rules in the Federal

Judicial Service Rules when read with the Public Service Rules exceeding the 60 days period

of disciplinary action will not vitiate the report of the investigative committee regardless of the

fact that there is no relief sought in that respect.” – PerNwodo, J.C.A., in F.J.S.C. v. Thomas

Suit No. CA/A/418/2001; (2013) 17 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1384) 503 at 548.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULES PROVIDING FOR INTERNAL AVENUE FOR SETTLING

DISPUTES.

Does the University of Abuja Decree No. 106 of 1992 provide internal avenues for settling

disputes? “Section 18(7) of the Decree as seen earlier does not say so. At the risk of repetition,

I quote herein below the said section – “18(7). No staff or student shall resort to a law Court

without exhausting the internal avenues for settling disputes or grievances, or for seeking

redress.” As I said earlier on, the Decree has not eloquently and distinctly specified any