Environmental Law

• Date: 29 June 2016

ENVIROMENTAL LAW

(1) COMPENSATION

1001. A plaintiff is not entitled to double compensation under the guise of

general damages.

“We take the view that where, as in this case, the loss is in itself of a financial

character, the assessment of damages is primarily a matter of arithmetic. It seems to

us that in such cases, the plaintiff, subject to the rule that special damages should be

strictly proved, is entitled in principle to full indemnity and no more. In other words,

such plaintiff is not entitled to be doubly compensated under the guise of general

damages. It has been well said that a Court of law is not a donor of charities; it gives

to either party only that which the justice of his case demands.”- Per Ibekwe, J.S.C.

in Soetan and Anor. v. Ogunno Suit No. S.C. 320/1979; (1975) All N.L.R. 359 at

364 – 365; (1975) 9 N.S.C.C. 360 at 364 - 365.

1002. Compensation is measured by the cost of repair or restoration of a

party to his original position.

(1) “The law reports are full of the guidelines which the Courts should follow in

quantifying the loss suffered by the plaintiff in actions of this nature. We shall simply

refer to a few cases by way of illustration. The first case is Livingstone v. Rawyards

Coal Co. [1880] 5 Appeal Cases 25 at page 39; where Lord Blackburn stated the

law as follows: - “Where any injury is to be compensated by damages … you should

as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the person who has

been injured…in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained

the wrong.”- Per Ibekwe, J.S.C. in Soetan and Anor. v. Ogunno Suit No. S.C. 320/

1979; (1975) All N.L.R. 359 at 363 – 364; (1975) 9 N.S.C.C. 360 at 364.

(2) “Turning now to the issue of double compensation which was raised by the learned

counsel for the appellant, we think that the complaint of learned counsel is well-

founded. It is said that “damages are compensation in money.” They are a sum of

money given to a successful plaintiff as compensation for loss or harm of any kind. It

seems to us that once a party has been fully compensated for the loss or harm

suffered by him it should not be open to the Court to proceed to award him any other

kind of additional damages that may look like a bonus. In cases such as the present

one, compensation is measured by the cost of repair or restoration of a party to his

original position, if and so far as the original position can be restored. This rule holds

good in cases which involve damage to property, inasmuch as property can generally

be replaced, if destroyed, or repaired, if damaged.”- Per Ibekwe, J.S.C. in Soetan

and Anor. v. Ogunno Suit No. S.C. 320/1979; (1975) All N.L.R. 359 at 363; (1975)

9 N.S.C.C. 360 at 363.

407

Compensation Paras. 1001,1002

Paras. 1003-1006 Vol. 9 ENVIROMENTAL LAW 408

1003. Damages are in their fundamental character compensatory.

“And damages, it has been said, “are in their fundamental character compensatory.

Whether the matter complained of be a breach of contract or a tort, the primary

theoretical notion is to place the plaintiff in a good a position, so far as money can do

it, as if the matter complained of had not occurred………… This primary notion is

controlled and limited by various considerations, but the central idea is compensa-

tion, as Blackstone … says – compensation and satisfaction …” See – Whitfield v.

De Lauret. & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C. L. R. 71 per Isaacs, J. at 80.”- Per Idigbe,

J.S.C. in Umudge and Anor. v. Shell – B.P. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. Suit No. S.C. 254/

73; (1975) 9 – 11 S.C. 155 at 162 – 163.

1004. Damages are pecuniary compensation given by process of law to a

person for the wrong that another has done to him.

“We concede that a claim which asks for “a fair and reasonable compensation” due

to the plaintiffs for damage done to the plaintiffs is most inappropriate in an action for

damages in tort. Where, however, as in the instant case, it seems clear from the state

of the pleadings that although the language of the summons speaks of “compensa-

tion” its substance or gist is really a claim for damages in tort, and the claim has gone

to trial in the Court below on that basis, it is our view that this Court ought not in those

circumstances to strike out such a claim. “Damages”, after all, have been defined

“as the pecuniary compensation which the law awards to a person for the injury he

has sustained by reason of the act or default of another, whether that act or default is

a breach of contract or a tort;” or put more shortly, “damages are the recompense

given by process of law to a person for the wrong that another has done him” See

Halsbury Laws of England: 3rd Ed. Vol. II. at 216.”- Per Idigbe, J.S.C. in Umudje

and Anor. v. Shell – B.P. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. Suit No. S.C. 254/73; (1975) 9 – 11

S.C. 155 at 162.

1005. Damages sometimes go beyond compensation.

“The expression “damages”, however cannot be regarded as synonymous with “com-

pensation” and, indeed, damages sometimes go beyond compensation; for example

where a plaintiff is allowed to recover, by way of damages, much more than his

actual loss.”- Per Idigbe, J.S.C. in Umudje and Anor. v. Shell – B.P. Dev. Co.

(Nig.) Ltd. Suit No. S.C. 254/73; (1975) 9 – 11 S.C. 155 at 163.

1006. Where it is established that a public nuisance has been committed the

damages recovered are meant to compensate a plaintiff for the loss put upon

him by the defendant’s actions.

“The appellant’s complaint is that the Court of Appeal was required from the ‘grounds

of appeal formulated and their stated view of the law to have assessed the damages

409 Compensation Paras. 1006-1008

suffered by the appellant, of course this would have followed naturally if the Court

had not erred in reversing the trial Judge on the finding of fact that respondents were

liable. This is because in discussing the question of liability for nuisance, they said, at

p. 136: - “It is the element of unreasonableness of the action leading to injury, its being

unnecessary for what was being done, and its leading to causation of injury that was

the direct, natural, immediate and necessary consequence of defendant’s act result-

ing in the injury to the plaintiff that is paramount in all such cases, if any common

feature is looked for.” They went on to say: - “And where it is established that a

public nuisance has been committed and loss or injury is established the damages

recovered are meant to compensate a plaintiff for the loss put upon him by the defen-

dants’ actions. The award is not computed on the basis of the difference between

value before the act complained of and the value after the injury. What is gen-

erally to be paid for is the loss flowing from the nuisance.”- Per Karibi-Whyte,

J.S.C. in Chief Ejowhomu v. Edok-Eter Mandilas Ltd. Suit No. S.C. 205/1985;

(1986) 9 S.C. 41 at 105 – 106; (1986) 17 N.S.C.C. (Pt. II) 1184 at 1198.

(2) DAMAGES

1007. Assessment of damages in respect of liability resulting from an es-

cape of oil-waste.

“However, although the learned trial Judge in the course of his judgment had ob-

served that the oil-waste “did some damage to the fish in the pond” and “killed the

fish therein” his award of damages was classified thus: - “for the 300 ponds the

plaintiffs are entitled to £6000. I also assess the injurious affection to their farm land

as £400. For the lakes I award a total of £800” We are satisfied that there is no

award for fishes destroyed, or killed (in or outside the ponds); the award of £6000 is

in respect of damaged ponds. The arguments in support of grounds 6 and 7 of the

grounds of appeal cannot therefore, have any effect on the judgment. Accordingly,

grounds (6) and (7) of the grounds of appeal fail.” - Per Idigbe, J.S.C. in Umudje

and Anor. v. Shell B.P. Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. Suit No. S.C. 254/73; (1975) 9 – 11

S.C. 155 at 174 - 175.

1008. Assessment of damages resulting from an injury affecting the plaintiff’s

land.

“Although no argument was directed to us by learned counsel for the appellants on

the damages awarded in favour of the respondents in regard to their farm lands and

lakes, the appeal however, is from the entire decision of the lower Court. We are far

from satisfied that the damages of £400 for “injurious affection” to their farm land

(a most curious expression, but which on the evidence before, and on the review of

the same by, the learned Judge could only mean, “damages for injury affecting” the

plaintiffs’ land), and the award of £800 “for the lakes” ought to be sustained. Both

awards are, in our view, erroneous in law. Save for the solitary reference by the