Election Petition

• Date: 29 June 2016

ELECTION PETITION

(1) ACCREDITATION PROCEDURE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

(BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS)

DECREE NO. 18 OF 1992

401. Procedure for accreditation under the national assembly (Basic

Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 18 of 1992 cannot

be waived.

“The question raised under the sixth and seventh issues were dealt with together in

the appellant’s brief. The evidence led by the appellant in relation to Yawulari polling

station (paras. 4(1)(a) and (aa) of the petition); Warni polling station (para. 4(1)(b) of

the petition): Samari polling station (para. 4(1)(e) of the petition) and Kundurung

polling station (para. 4(1)(f) of the petition) was that persons recorded as having

voted were more than the persons who were accredited at each of the polling sta-

tions mentioned above. That was the real question in this connection and not the

question whether the provisions of the Decree regarding procedure for accreditation

could be waived. The question is a question of law and the answer is in the negative,

that is the provisions of Decree No. 18 of 1992 regarding the procedure for accredi-

tation cannot be waived.”- Per Adio, J.C.A. in Balami v. Bwala Suit No. CA/J/184/

92; (1993) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 267) 51 at 66-67.

(2) ADDRESS FOR SERVICE

402. Effect of failure to include the address of service and the name of the

occupier thereof in election petition.

(1) “The Tribunal has held that where the address for service and its occupier are not

stated in a petition the petition is incompetent and it is so held in this appeal. The

earlier cases of the sixties which deal with Electoral Act of 1962, having similar

provisions as paragraph 5(4) have decided that failure to include in an election peti-

tion the name of the occupier of the petitioner’s address for service is not a formal

defect or mere curable irregularity, notably in Ngelizana v. Hindi (1965) (supra),

Okeabor v. Bare (1959-60), (supra) Ogedengbe v. Fajemisin (1959) (supra) and

Iyedufe v. Ali (1965) N.N.L.R. P. 26. CA/E/42/99 Chief John Olibie v. Paul Chigo

Okeke and 4 Ors. (1998) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 613) 165 when paragraphs 5(4) of Schedule

6 came for consideration I had this to say: - “The petition cannot be regarded as

validly presented where paragraph 5(4) which is mandatory is not complied with

regardless of the fact that it appears in a Schedule and that the sub-paragraph termi-

nates with a discretion reserved in the Tribunal.” I went further in that

case to say that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal must have regard to S. 132

of the Decree, which specifically provides that presentation of a petition shall be

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Accreditation procedure in the national assembly....................Paras. 401,402

Paras. 402-405 Vol. 9 ELECTION PETITION 142

done within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of result. An obvious

consequence that will follow this is that if the Tribunal does not direct otherwise,

within the time limited for presentation of a petition, a petition which failed to disclose

the name of an occupier of an address for service could not be taken as validly

presented petition within the statutory period of 30 days.” - Per Galadima, J.C.A. in

Ikeakor v Elosiuba Suit No. CA/E/47/99; (1999) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 613) 153 at 162-

163.

(2) “It is for easy reach out to the petitioner who is expected to be served within 5km

of a post office within the Judicial Division. In his petition, the petitioner gave his

address for service within 5km of a post office within Judicial Division, which is No.

33 Iboku Street, Odoakpu Onitsha. It does not have to be at Awka where the Tribunal

was sitting as the Tribunal erroneously misconceived. It is in this light that I say here

that the Tribunal is wrong to have found that paragraph 5(4) is not duly complied

with. The petitioner in the 1st paragraph of his petition gave his address as No. 33

Iboku Stereet, Odoakpu Onitsha and repeated the same at the last page of his peti-

tion. He has substantially complied with paragraph 5(4) of the 6th Schedule.” - Per

Galadima, J.C.A. in Ikeakor v. Elosiuba Suit No. CA/E/47/99; (1999) 8 N.W.L.R.

(Pt. 613) 153 at 163.

403. Rationale for requiring address for service in election petition.

“It then held that the petition has not conformed substantially with the provision of

paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 6 to Decree of 1999. The reason for the provision of sub-

paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 is quite clear. It is for easy reach out to the petitioner who

is expected to be served within 5km of a post office within the Judicial Division.” -

Per Galadima, J.C.A. in Ikeakor v. Elosiuba Suit No. CA/E/47/99; (1999) 8 N.W.L.R.

(Pt. 613) 153 at 163.

404. What election petition must contain under paragraph 5(4) of Schedule

6 to the national assembly (basic constitutional and transitional provisions)

Decree No. 3 of 1999.

“So it is clear to me that the provisions of paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 6 of the Decree

No. 3 of 1999 stated above is mandatory and substantial and never procedural. Fail-

ure to comply with it is not to be regarded as a simple irregularity which can be

waived by the conduct of the respondent or by the grace of the Tribunal.” - Per

Munkata-Coomassie, J.C.A. in Hanina v. Magaji Suit No. CA/EPSA/1/99; (1999)

5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 602) 230 at 238.

(3) AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IN ELECTION PETITION

405. Proof of agency relationship in election cases.

(1) “In Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 15, 4th Ed., Para. 698, p. 375, the learned

143

Agency relationship in election petition Paras. 405,406

editors summarised the law as follows: - “698 Evidence of agency. In order to prove

agency it is not necessary to show that the person was actually appointed by the

candidate or that he was paid. The crucial test is whether there has been employ-

ment or authorisation of the agent by the candidate to do some election work or the

adoption of his work when done. The candidate, however, is liable not only for the

acts of the agents whom he has himself appointed or authorised, but also for the acts

of agents employed by his election agent or by an other agent having authority to

employ others. He may be liable even though his election agent refused to employ the

agent. In the absence of authorisation or ratification the candidate must be proved

either by himself or his acknowledge agents to have employed the agent to act on his

behalf, or to have to some extent put himself in the agent’s hands, or to have made

common measure with him for the purpose of promoting the candidate’s election.

The candidate must have entrusted the alleged agent with some material part of the

business of the election. Mere non-interference on the candidate’s part with persons

who, feeling interested in the candidate’s success, may act in support of his canvass

is not sufficient to saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of theirs of which the

candidate and his election agent are ignorant.” - Per Akanbi, J.C.A. in Ayua v. Adasu

Suit No. CA/J/50/92; (1992) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 231) 598 at 611.

(2) “The long line of decided cases in our Court also support the view expressed

above. For example in Gabriel Adediran v. Ganiyu Ladapo & Ors. (1991) 1

L.R.E.C.N. 110 at 112 it was held that a candidate cannot be held responsible for

what other people did in the form of “unsolicited aid” of which he or his election

agent was ignorant. See also Nuhu Musa & Anor. v. National Electoral Commis-

sion & 5 Ors. (1989) I.N.E.P.L.R. 20 at 36. From the above therefore it is crystal

clear that on the facts found, appellant cannot be held responsible for any of the acts

complained of.” - Per Akanbi, J.C.A. in Ayua v. Adasu Suit No. CA/J/50/92; (1992)

3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 231) 598 at 612.

(4) ALLEGATION OF ACTS OF THUGGERY AT POLLING STATION

406. Nature of allegation that a person caused disturbance or engaged in

acts of thuggery at polling station.

(1) “An allegation that a Person caused disturbance or engaged in acts of thuggery at

a Polling station for the purpose of preventing, interrupting or interfering with voting

is an offence punishable with fine of N5,000 or imprisonment for three years or both

under Section 66(1) of Decree No, 18 of 1992. The alleged offence could not be

severed from the other averment in paragraph 4(l)(c) of the petition, as contended by

the learned counsel for the respondent.” - Per Adio, J.C.A in Balami v. Bwala Suit

No. CA/J/184/92; (1993) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 267) 51 at 66.

(2) “By the provision of Section 66(1) of Decree No. 18 of 1992, an allegation that a

person caused a disturbance or engaged in acts of thuggery at a polling station for the