EDET V. THE STATE

• Pages: 175-194

EDET V. THE STATE



175

tive, direct and

unequivocal,

it seems to me unnecessary to resort to the presump-

tion under section 148(a) however attractive. Section 148(a) Evidence Act though

equally probative, is at best a very strong circumstantial evidence - See

Ukorah v.

The State

(1977) 4 S.C. 167.

5





In the old English case of

Omychund v. Barker

(1745) 1 Atk. 21, at p.49, Lord

Hardwicke was reported as having said:

"the judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is one general rule

of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will allow".

10

It is conceded in the instant case that the nature of the case allows both direct

eye witness evidence and the presumption. The calling in aid of the two may not

merely be complimentary but undesirable duplication. For the reasons I have given

above the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

15

AGBAJE, J.S.C.: On 22nd September, 1988 I dismissed the appellant's appeal. I

indicated then that I will give fuller reasons for my decision today. I have had the

opportunity of reading in draft the lead reasons for judgment given by my learned

brother Craig, J.S.C. I agree with his reasoning and I adopt the reasons he gave as

20



my reasons for dismissing the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

25



EDET V. THE STATE

INYANG EDET



APPELLANT

30



V

THE STATE



RESPONDENT

SUIT NO. SC 16/1987

SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

ESO,



J.S.C.

35

40

NNAMANI,

UWAIS,

KARIBI-WHYTE,

AGBAJE,

WALT,

CRAIG,

2nd December, 1988

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

J.S.C.

Criminal Law and Procedure - Murder - Causing death by stabbing with broken bottle -

45



Magistrate Court - Validity of - Whether abuse of process.

Whether murder or manslaughter - Trial on information while charge is pending at

Constitutional Law - Fundamental hun tan rights - right to personal liberty, fair hearing and

trial within reasonable time, sections 32(1), 33(4) of the Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria - Filing of two charges at different courts on the same facts - Whether

violation of - Power to file information -Attorney- General of a state - Whether curtailed

by pending charge at lower court - Section 191( 1) of the Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria.

50

176



NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES



[19881 3 N.S.C.C.

ISSUES:

1.

Where a law officer files an information in accordance with the provisions of the

Criminal Procedure Law, is such information vitiated by reason of an irregularity

in respect of a different charge in another court on the same facts.

2.

Where two criminal charges are prefered on the same facts in two different courts,

will a constitutional breach with respect to fair hearing within a reasonable time

in the one, operate to nullify the proceedings in the other against which no breach

had been alleged.

3.

Whether an appellate court can entertain a complaint based on an irregularity in

respect of proceedings other than the one leading to the appeal before it.

4.

Whether the mere filing of a fresh charge on the same facts in a different court

while an earlier charge is pending constitutes a violation of the provisions of

Section 33(4) of the 1979 Constitution.

5.

Whether it is an abuse of legal process to file a charge for a more serious offence

in a High Court while a charge for a lesser offence is pending in a lower court,

both charges arising from the same facts.

6.

Whether the pendency of a charge before a magistrate court, can curtail the

Attorney-General's powers under S.191(1) of the 1979 Constitution to institute

criminal proceedings on the same facts in the High Court.

7.

When will a procedural irregularity vitiate the proceedings in a case.

8.

Whether a finding (in an indictment for murder) that the weapon used in the killing

was a piece of broken bottle and not a knife or a gun is sufficient (on the

authorities) to reduce the offence of murder to manslaughter.

FACTS:

During a quarrel, the appellant, along with some others, physically assaulted one

Macaulay (song. While one of his confederates held their victim the appellant picked

a bottle (which had been thrown to him by another member of his group), broke it

and stabbed the helpless victim on the abdomen. The wounded man was rushed

to the hospital by his wife, but died seven days later. The police filed a charge of

manslaughter against the accused, now appellant with one other in the Yaba Magis-

trate Court on the 15th of July, 1983. However, on the 6th of April, 1984, while the

charge in the Magistrate Court was still pending, the Director of Public Prosecutions,

Lagos State (through a law officer in his Department) filed an information for murder

in the High Court against the appellant and four others.

At the trial in the High Court, there was medical evidence that the deceased had

died as a result of internal haemorrhage due to stab wounds inflicted with a sharp

object. In his evidence in chief, the appellant denied that he had stabbed the de-

ceased with any sharp instrument. He also testified that he had been charged for

manslaughter in the Magistrate Court, tendering the charge sheet in evidence. At

the close of the case for the defence, appellant's counsel addressed the court, sub-

mitting that the proceedings in the High Court was a nullity by reason of the pend-

ing charge of manslaughter against the accused in the Magistrate Court. The learned

trial judge convicted the appellant as charged and sentenced him to death. discharg-

ing and acquitting his co-accused persons. In doing so, the trial court decried the

practice of bringing two charges against an accused person at different courts on

the same facts.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal where he contended that the pend-

ing charge at the magistrate court vitiated the charge for murder in the High Court,

because it constituted a violation of the provisions of sections 32(1) and 33(4) of the

1979 Constitution with regard to fair hearing within a reasonable time. The Court of

Appeal dismissed the appeal and the appellant appealed further to the Supreme

Court on the self-same grounds. He also contended that in all cases where an ac-

cused person had used a broken bottle to inflict injury on the deceased, there had

either been a conviction or a discharge and acquittal of such an accused because

1(

1!

2(

3(

3f.

4(

5(