DEMUREN V. ASUNI & ANOR.

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NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

[1967] N.S.C.C.

claim and showed that if this court had appreciated that there was an appeal against

the decision of the High Court in respect of it, then it would have dismissed it. In

both the judgment of this court and the order drawn up following the judgment it

was clearly stated that the order of the High Court dismissing the defendants'

counter-claim should stand.

As stated before, this application fails and it is dismissed. The defendants/ap-

pellants will pay to the plaintiff/respondent the costs of this application fixed at 30

guineas.

Application dismissed.

DEMUREN V. ASUNI & ANOR.

Z.O. DEMUREN

V

ASHIMI ASUNI AND ANOTHER

SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

ADEMOLA,

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C.J.N.

COKER,

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J.S.C.

LEWIS,

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J.S.C.

10th March, 1967

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APPELLANT

RESPONDENTS

SUIT NO. SC 378/1965

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25

Civil Action - Practice and Procedure - Application of English Rules where

local rules silent.

Appeals - Appeals from Customary Courts (W.N.) to High Court - Enlargement

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of time within which to file grounds - jurisdiction in Customary Courts Law

(W.N.) section 48(1), section 50(2); Customary Court Rules 0.18 r.2(d) (repealed

and replaced by) 4.28 and r.4; High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 0.35, r.10.

ISSUE:

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1. On what considerations should a court grant an extension of time in which to

file grounds of appeal where no such provision exists under the local rules of

court?

FACTS:

In 1963, the defendant/appellant gave notice of appeal from the Grade A Cus-

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tomary Court, under section 48(1) of the Customary Courts Law (W.N.). One year

later he applied to the High Court for leave to file his grounds of appeal out of

time.

Formerly, the Customary Court's power under 0.18, r.2 of the Customary Court

Rules to impose conditions of appeal included the power to specify the time with-

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in which to file grounds of appeal. This power was conferred by virtue of r.2(d).

In 1962 r.2(d) was replaced by r.2B which prescribed a period of thirty days from

date of judgment as the tine limit but made no provision for extending the pres-

cribed period. Also, r.4, which effectively gave the appeal court discretion to ex-

tend the time for complying with an order made under r.2 was not amended to

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embrace the new r.26.

The judge heard argument first on whether he had the power to grant the ap-

plication, and secondly on the merits of the appeal. When arguments were con-

cluded he held that he had no power to enlarge the statutory prescribed time and

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