CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

• Date: 24 January 2019

(1) "Acts calculated to prejudice the due course of justice may amount to criminal contempt whether committed before, during or after proceedings Attn. - Gen. v. Butterworth (1963) 1 Q.B. 696; (1962) 3 All E.R. 326. Victimising a person who has given evidence or is likely to give evidence is one of such acts, Attn.-Gen v. Butterworth (supra); Chapman v. Hong (1963) 2 Q.B. 502; (1963) 2 All E.R. 513, C.A.it is immaterial that the alleged contemnor has no intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice (as this is not an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of Court); it is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely as so interfere. R. v. Odham’s Press Ltd. Ex parte Attorney-General (1956) 3 All E.R. 4041 (1957) 1 Q.B. 73." - Per Adio, J.C.A. in Umoru v. Omoijahe Suit No. CA/B/ 174/90; (1992) 6 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 249) 593 at 605.

(2) "The general rule therefore is as stated in Taylor v. Asmedh Koonwar (1865) 4 S.W.R. at page 86, as follows:- "It is contrary to the practice of all Courts of justice, unfair to an adversary and a contempt of Court for a suitor, under any pretext whatever, to communicate with a Judge, except by public proceedings in open Court, respecting the merits of any case in which he is interested and which is either pending in the Court of such Judge or likely to come before him." The same view of the law was expressed in stronger language by Lord Cattenham In Re-Dyce Sombre (1849) 41 E.R. 114, when he said at page 116 as follows:- "Every private communication to a Judgefor the purpose of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly before him always is and ought to be reprobated, it is a course calculated, if tolerated, to divert the course of justice, and is...