COURT

• Date: 24 January 2019

(1) "Court means the Federal High Court." - Section 38, Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act, Cap. 131, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria ,1990; Section 41, Federal Environment Protection Agency Act, Cap. F10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

(2) "Means the High Court." - Section 2, Partnership Law, Cap. 84, Laws of Ondo State, 1978; also applies Mutatis Mutandis to similar Laws in Ekiti, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Delta, and Edo States of Nigeria.

(3) "Means the High Court." - Section 2, Property and Conveyancing Law, Cap. 97, Laws of Ondo State, 1978; also applies Mutatis Mutandis to similar Laws in Ekiti, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Delta, and Edo States of Nigeria.

(4) "Means the Magistrates Court." - Section 37, Fire Service Act, Cap. 147, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; Cap. F29, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

(5) "In addition to the arguments of the parties, the Court had the benefit of hearing Dr. Elias, the learned Attorney General of the Federation, who referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edition) volume 9, page 342, and to Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C. 275, on what is a Court, where the Privy Council enumerated some negative propositions on the subject. Dr. Elias suggested that it was a mistake to regard the auditor as a Court on the ground that he could, under Section 204 of the Local Government Law, hear evidence on oath which had inclined the learned counsel for the respondent to think, at first, that the auditor might be regarded as a Court. From page 297 of the Privy Council decision it is clear that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court in the strict sense because it hears witnesses on oath. We are in agreement with Dr. Elias that the respondent was not a Court." - Per Bairamian, J.S.C. in Mekwunye v. Director of Audit (W.N.) Suit No. S.C. 364/1965; (1967) 5 N.S.C.C. 223 at 226.

(6) "It is relevant to mention that the words "Court", "tribunal" are not defined in the Constitution. The Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Cap. 89 and the Interpretation Act, 1964, have not defined the words either; indeed, no kind of Courts or Tribunals have been defined. The definition sections of the High Court laws which define "Court" to "include the High Court and the Judges of the High Court sitting together or separately" or a magistrate Court to mean a Magistrate Court established in an area under the Magistrates Court Law etc. adopted the same approach. S. 2 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62 states "Court" includes "all judges, and Magistrates and except arbitrators all persons legally authorised to take evidence". The various meanings of the word "Court" in Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. 1 2nd Ed. at pp 367-370, has made no improvement on the above. One of the definitions of the word "Court" in the Pocket Oxford Dictionary, 6th Ed at p. 5 187 is that "it is a body with judicial powers, tribunal It is with the institutional writers and judicial decisions that we find attempts at an exposition of what indeed a Court or tribunal is. Even this definition is not quite helpful. The only definition which seems to be quoted is that of Coke on Littleton (58a), repeated by Blackstone in his Commentaries of the Law of England Vol. iii p. 23. It is as follows: - "Curia, Court is a place where justice is judicially administered." Stricto sensu, this is a description of the place, howbeit cryptic, where justice judicially administered, and not the concept of that place where justice is judicially administered. It is the last mentioned concept which several writers and judges have in several decisions grappled with, with doubtful success. The assumption in both Coke and Blackstone, and the Holdsworth in his History of English Law 7th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 87, as it is true today, was that all Courts derive their authority from the sovereign. In the circumstance of this country, the judicial power of the Constitution is vested in the institutions so declared in Section 6 of the Constitution and already stated above. Thus, the question whether a statutory body can be described as possessing judicial powers is determinable by examining its functions in the light of the Constitution which has conferred such powers. See: Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8 - 11 S.C. 149." - Per Karibi-whyte, J.S.C. in Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Comm. v. Fawehinmi Suit No. S.C. 177/1984; (1985) 16 N.S.C.C. (Pt. II) 998 at 1044.

(7) "Accordingly, in compliance with the provisions of Section 33(1), a Court or tribunal is any statutory body which has power to decide controversies and give binding decisions. According to this view, the test necessary for the determination whether a statutory body has judicial powers are: - (1) whether it has before it a lis inter partes (2) whether the decision of the statutory body is binding (3) whether the decision is conclusive and final. Lis inter partes or justiciable issue. It is an essential prerequisite of the exercise of judicial power that there must be a dispute requiring determination; or as it is referred to lis inter partes or justiciable issue. In Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd. (l949) A.C. 134; 149, it was declared, "The conception of the judicial function is inseparably bound up with the idea of a suit between parties". A justiciable issue or lis inter partes undoubtedly arises in conflicts between individual parties, a party and the State an individual and a public authority and an individual and a professional association. Hence when clearly it is a question of penalties and or a disqualification imposed on a professional man by his association, there is a very definite lis between accuser and accused. It is conceded that a lis is not an invariable of a Court or Tribunal. This is because a coroner’s Court has no lis inter partes before it. Hence though helpful, the test of lis inter partes is not an invariable distinction between a statutory body exercising judicial powers, and a body which exercises merely administrative powers. In Everett v. Griffiths (1921) 1 A.C. at p. 683, Atkinson L.J. used the expression "judicial act" as a distinction. In his view: - "a judicial act is an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances, imposing liabilities and affecting the rights of others." It is conceded that a judicial act may be performed by a body not vented with judicial powers, but exercising ministerial powers. Atkinson L.J.’s view would seem to be applicable to the determination of almost any Tribunal. BINDING DECISION. The other test is whether the decision is binding on the parties. The bindingness of the determinations of the statutory body without the need for confirmation or adoption by any other authority is one of the essential characteristics of the exercise of judicial power. Thus, where the determination is binding, it is immaterial that it is subject to confirmation by another body. It is still an exercise of judicial power. It is conceded that where the order of an administrative body is made binding by statute, this per se, will not clothe such powers with judicial quality. It is therefore not an invariable characteristic of a judicial power. CONCLUSIVENESS. Conclusiveness of the determination is another characteristic of the exercise of judicial power. The provision of channels of appeal to another body from its determination does not divest the determination of its conclusive nature and the statutory body of its judicial character. One of the characteristic qualities of a judicial proceeding is that it terminates in a binding and conclusive decision until reversed on appeal. A combination of these characteristics will result in the vesting of a statutory body with the powers of resolving any disputed questions of law or fact by reference to established principles of law. Thus, a Court, tribunal or statutory body exercising judicial powers must act in a judicial capacity, when after investigation and deliberation, it comes to a conclusive determination of the issue by the application of established legal rules or objective legal standards to the facts found by it. It is too well settled to reiterate the judicial function that interpreting, declaring and applying the law are its accepted hall marks. See: Moses v. Parker (1896) A.C. 245 and United Engineering Workers’ Union v. Devanayagam (1968) A.C. 356. Notwithstanding what has been stated above, in sum judicial acts may be identified by...