Court

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COURT.

CONDUCT OF CASES.

Ability of judges and Courts to know when an accused tells a lie. “The position of the

law on the probative value of an exhibit and evidence, thereafter on it is clear. Apart from the

probative strength of exhibit C vis-a-vis the parol evidence of the appellant, our adjectival law will

regard his evidence as an afterthought. Exhibit C is the real thing. The evidence of the appellant,

apart from being unreal, is a fabrication aimed at exonerating or exculpating himself from criminal

responsibility. Courts of law are very much equipped to see through appellant’s smartness and

gimmick.” – Per Tobi, J.S.C., in Onwudiwe v. F.R.N. Suit No. S.C. 41/2003; (2006) 10 N.W.L.R.

(Pt. 988) 382 at 427.

Attitude of court to counsel’s hardwork and industry. “I take this opportunity once more to

comment and commend the learned counsel involved in this matter especially Olanipekun and

Yusuf Alli ESQS, SANS. They handled the matter with utmost respect to the Court. We have seen

the evidence of hardwork and deep research they exhibited in their respective Briefs. We have

learnt tremendously by their handwork and presentation in Court without any rancour. We have

enjoyed their decency and decorum which is classic and worthy of emulation by all and sundry.”

– Per Muntaka-Coomassie, J.C.A., in Ajadi v. Ajibola Suit No. CA/IL/EPT/NA/1/2004; (2004) 16

N.W.L.R. (Pt. 898) 91 at 183.

Attitude of Court to inconsistency in a party’s case. “Inconsistency is abhorred by the law. Also,

no party may argue the opposite of his case already in evidence before the Court.” – Per Nzeako

J.C.A., in M.M. Ali Co. Ltd. v. Goni Suit No. CA/J/86/2002; (2006) 10 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 987) 88 at

109.

Attitude of Court to technicalities. “The principle has been well established that negligence or

fault on the part of counsel should not be visited on the litigant. See Ogundoyin v. Adeyemi (2001)

9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 730) 403; & NEPA v. Savage (2001) 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 717) 230. In other words, it

is not right to visit parties with punishment arising out of the mistakes or inadvertence or

negligence of counsel, see CBN v. Ahmed (2001) 11 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 724) 369. The application

should be granted in the interest of justice, and I am strengthened by the observation of Nnamani,

J.S.C., in Erisi v. Idika (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 66) 503, as follows: - “The Courts are Courts of

law but may the day never come when they cease to be Courts of justice. Substantial justice cannot

be done unless Courts of justice strain to ensure that appeals are heard on their merit.” Today, the

weight of judicial opinion is predominantly in favour of the Court doing substantial justice rather

than undue adherence on rules of Court and technicalities. See Nalsa & Team Associates v.

N.N.P.C. (1991) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 212) 652; &The Vice Chancellor Abu Zaria v. Yau Alhaji Ado

(1986) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 31) 684. The application is therefore granted as prayed, as it is important

that the appeal be heard on its merit.” – Per Augie, J.C.A., in Okumagba v. Esisi Suit No.

CA/B/38/94; (2005) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 916) 501 at 514.

Can Court be confined to application of principles referred to by counsel. “Firstly, in the case

of Lt. Col. Mrs. Finnih v. Imade (1992) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 219) 511 at 537; (1992) 1 S.C.N.J. 87 at

107 – 108 – Karibi –Whyte, J.S.C., had this to say: “It is strange to say that the Judge cannot apply

principles not referred to by counsel. The day such a principle of law is accepted, the true demise

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of the independence of the Judge in deciding cases before him is assured. The oath of the Judge is

to do justice according to law and to all manner of people without fear or favour, affection or ill-

will.” See also Inua v. Nta Asuquo (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 576 per Idigbe, J.S.C.” – Per Ogbuagu,

J.C.A., in Dahiru v. Kamale Suit No. CA/J/68/97; (2005) 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 929) 8 at 49.

Can Court of law operates at pace of party. “A Court of law does not operate at the pace of a

party and a party must be desirous of prosecuting his case diligently and timeously.” – Per

Fasanmi, J.C.A., in Adebayo v. T.S.G. (Nig.) Ltd. Suit No. CA/I/75/03; (2011) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.

1238) 493 at 508.

Course open to Court where party fails to call evidence. “It is the law that where a party fails

to call evidence in support of his case or in rebuttal of the case of the opposite party, the trial Court

is entitled to resolve the matter against that party unless there be some other legal reasons to the

contrary. Imana v. Robinson (1979) 3-4 S.C. 1; Odunsi v. Bamgbala (1995) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 374)

641.” – Per Nzeako, J.C.A., in Lawan v. Yama Suit No. CA/J/164/2003; (2004) 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt.

877) 117 at 143.

Difference between rehearing a case set aside on appeal and a case transferred from one

Judge to another Judge of concurrent jurisdiction. “The procedure for rehearing a case set as ide

as a nullity on appeal is different from the rehearing of a case transferred from one Judge to another

Judge of concurrent jurisdiction. In the case of rehearing after appeal, the hearing begins on a clean

slate without reference whatever to the proceedings in the judgment declared a nullity. Where a

case is transferred from one Judge to another, all final decisions and orders of the previous Court

remain binding on the parties and can only be the subject of an appeal. The second Judge has no

jurisdiction to set aside directly or indirectly the decision of the former Judge as that would mean

sitting on appeal against the decision of his brother Judge of concurrent jurisdiction.” – Per

Iyizoba, J.C.A., in Soyinka v. Oni Suit No. CA/B/209/2005; (2011) 13 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1264) 294 at

311.

Duty of counsel in the conduct of the case of his client.

“I further find that the refusal of Counsel for the Appellants to heed the advice of the Court below

is a deliberate refusal to serve the interest of the clients. The locus classicus case of Nweke v.

Okafor (supra) was delivered on 9th March, 2007, before the Judgment of the High Court was

delivered in 2012. The implication of the decision in Nweke v. Okafor had an earthquake effect in

the legal profession in Nigeria immediately that position was pronounced by the Supreme Court.

Most lawyers who had the interest of their clients at heart quickly adjusted their client’s position

in accordance with the new position of the decision law, If the Appellants had adjusted their

position immediately at the trial Court which proceeding lasted 17 years, they would not now be

caught with their pants down. The Appellants in their reply brief contended that the 1st and 2nd

Respondents will benefit from their wrong if this appeal is dismissed. The Appellants argued that

1st and 2nd Respondents should not be allowed to raise objections to their own processes which

they filed at the trial Court and invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the Court. On this, I have to say

that the fact that the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a void originating process and both parties

proceeded erroneously on it, does not preclude the issue of jurisdiction from being raised on

appeal. Counsel for the Appellants who were the Defendants and counter claimants at the trial

Court also owed his Clients a duty to have been diligent in pointing out the errors on the Writ of

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Summons earlier at the trial Court, immediately the case of Nweke v. Okafor (supra) was decided.

Perhaps this issue would have been settled at the trial Court and counsel would have long since

refiled his case if he so desired.” – Per Ogunwumiju, J.S.C., in Oyekan & Ors v. Aberuagba &

Ors Suit No. S.C.146/2018; (2023) L.P.E.L.R. – 62196 at 35 – 36.

Duty on Court dealing with interlocutory application to refrain from pronouncing on the

substantive matter. “Undoubtedly it has been made clear in the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal

& Anr. v. Okoroafor & Anr. (2001) 18 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 745) 295 that the Court ought to refrain from

making pronouncements touching upon the main issue that would have to be determined between

the parties. In our case the statements made by the trial Court was in the exercise of determining

the locus standi of the plaintiffs and or cause of action. In the exercise the Court below had a duty

to consider the alleged facts in the statement of claim.” – Per Mika’ilu, J.C.A., in P.V.C. Ltd. v.

Lawal Suit No. CA/IL/35/2000 (2005) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 911) 121 at 150.

Duty on Court determining interlocutory issue to avoid pronouncing on substantive issues.

(1) “A trial Court must be cautious in deciding interlocutory issues raised in a suit in order to avoid

taking a decision on the substantive issue in the suit, an act which is usually frowned at by the law.

In the present case the trial Court has prejudged the substantive suit with its finding in the

interlocutory ruling that there was no higher authority than the National Working Committee and

has utilized exhibit P1 produced by the respondent in spite of the existence of exhibit PDP1

produced by the appellants in resolving one of the issues in the substantive suit. By this finding,

the trial Court in effect decided a substantive relief sought by the respondent contrary to the rule

that a Court should not decide a substantive issue in a case whilst delivering its ruling on an

interlocutory issue. This finding should have been after the trial of the substantive suit on merit

and not on an interlocutory application. For this reason, the trial judge is hereby disqualified from

adjudicating on this mater. See the cases of Egbe v. Onogun (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt. 1) 95; UBA

v. Ekpo (supra) and NDIC v. S.B.N. Plc (2003) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 801) 311 and Jimoh v. Olawoye

(supra).” – Per Uwa, J.C.A., in P.D.P. v. Abubakar Suit No. CA/A/212/06; (2007) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.

1022) 515 at 543. (2) “It is trite that while dealing with preliminary or interlocutory matters, the

Court is not entitled to make any comments, pronouncement or observation in its ruling on that

application which might appear to prejudge or pre-empt the main issue in the proceedings relative

to the interlocutory application. Mortune v. Gambo (1979) 3-4 S.C. pg. 54 Omonuwa v. A-G.,

Benue State (1983) 4 N.W.L.R. pg. 237 Olaniyi v. Aroyehun (1991) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 194) pg. 652

A.-G., Anambra State v. Okeke (2002) 12 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 782) pg. 575.” – Per Adekeye, J.C.A., in

P.D.P. v. Abubakar Suit No. CA/A/212/06; (2007) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1022) 515 at 548. (3) “ In a

ruling on an interlocutory application, the Court should avoid making any observation that might

appear to prejudge the main issue in contention between the parties: see Sylvanus Mortune v. Alhaji

Mohammed Gambo (1979) 3-4 S.C. 54 at 56; (1983) 4 N.C.L.R. 237 at 242. In an interlocutory

matter, parties must not only shy away from the merit of the matter but must completely refrain

therefrom; Ojukwu v. Government of Lagos State (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 26) 39.” – Per Edozie,

J.S.C., in Okotie-Eboh v. Manager Suit No. S.C. 197/2003; (2004) 18 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 905) 242 at

267. (4) “The law is trite and has been pronounced in plethora of authorities that the Court is

precluded from deciding the main suit at the interlocutory stage and without allowing the parties

to marshall out arguments in respect of the suit. Relevant in support is the case of University Press

Ltd. v. I.K. Martins (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 654) p. 584 at 595 paras. E-F wherein the

apex Court per Achike, J.S.C. said: “……..the trial Courts well as intermediate appellate Courts