COURE & ANOR V. THE PROBATE REGISTRAR, LAGOS.

• Pages: 220-221

220

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NIGERIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

[1964] N.S.C.C.

COURE & ANOR V. THE PROBATE REGISTRAR,

LAGOS.

1.

PAUL COURE

2.

THERESA ABOUD

V

THE PROBATE REGISTRAR, LAGOS

SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

BRETT,



J.S.C.

COKER,



J.S.C.

IDIGBE,



J.S.C.

16th October, 1964

APPELLANTS

RESPONDENT

SUIT NO. FSC 330/1963

Legislation - Supreme Court (Civil Procedure), Rules, 1954 (1948 Laws of Nigeria,

vol. X) 0.48, R.11 and second Schedule, item 28.

Words and Phrases - "Value" in those provisions.

ISSUE:

1. Upon what criterion should the fee for a grant of probate or letters of

administration be assessed?

FACTS:

On the question whether the fee upon grant of probate or letters of administra-

tion should be charged on the gross value of the personal property of the de-

ceased, or on the value of such property less debts due from him to third parties,

at the time of his death, the appellants whose contention (that the fees be assessed

on the net value of the personal property of the deceased) was rejected by the

High Court, appealed to the Supreme Court.

HELD:

Item 28 speaks of the value of the property affected by the grant, and the grant

affects the gross value, so, the hardship and inconvenience to the estate notwith-

standing, the fee must plainly be reckoned on the gross value of the personal

property, excluding, however, what is mentioned in the proviso to Rule 11 in 0.48.

of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1954.

CASE REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT:

1.

Hutton v. Harper

(1875-76) 1 App. Cas. 474, 474.

J.A.

Cole, for the appellants.

O.A.

Soetan,

for the respondent.

IDIGBE, J.S.C.

(Delivering the Judgment of the Court): The point in this appeal

is whether the fees payable on the grant of Letters of Administration by an applicant

should be assessed by the Respondent on the gross value of the personal property

of a deceased person or on the value of such property less debts due from the

deceased to third parties, at the time of his death. The contention of the appellants

that the fees should be assessed on what may be described as the net value of the