CONSTRUCTION OF ?ANY PERSON' IN THE LIMITATION LAW UNDER SECTION 2(A) OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS (PROTECTION) LAW

• Date: 24 January 2019

(1) "In my respectful view, the law does not apply to persons generally but to a particular class of persons, that is, public officers and it is in that context, I believe, that the word "person" should be constructed. I have support for this view not only in the authorities just referred to but also in the House of Lords" decision in Bradford Corporation v. Myers (1916) 1 A.C. 242, 247. Section 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1891 (which was on all fours with Section 2 of our Public Officers Protection Law under consideration in this appeal) provided:- "Where after the commencement of this Act any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, duty, or authority, the following provisions shall have effect." In construing the words "any person" in the section, Lord Buckmaster, LC observed: - "Now it must be conceded that the Act applies only to a definite class of persons and to a definite class of action. If the section stood alone, and were construed without reference to the introductory words of the statute, it would be wide enough to grant protection to any person who was acting in pursuance of a private Act of Parliament, but on more than one occasion the Courts have pointed out that this cannot be its true interpretation, and that "any person" must be limited so as to apply only to public authorities (in our case, public officers). The case of Attorney-General v. Company of Proprietors of Margate Pier and Harbour (1900) 1 Ch. 749 is an excellent illustration of such a case, and this was expressly approved by Channel J, in Parker v.London Country Council (1904) 2 K.B. 501." (Words in brackets are mine). I also have support in the case of Momoh v. Okewale & Anor. (supra), a case decided by this Court 2 years after Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works & Anor. v. Balogun (supra) was decided. In Momoh v. Okewale, this Court was faced directly with the construction of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, which is in pari materia with Section 2 of the Law now under consideration. Sir Udoma, J.S.C. that erudite Judge delivering the judgment of the Court which consisted of one of the justices that sat on the Balogun’s case, distinguished our own Law from the...