CONSPIRACY CHARGE

• Date: 24 January 2019

(1) "Generally, it may be stated that where persons are charged with criminal conspiracy, it is usually required that the conspiracy, as laid in the charge be proved, and that the persons charged be also proved to have been engaged in it. On the other hand, as it is not always easy to prove the actual agreement, Courts usually consider it sufficient if it be established by evidence the circumstances from which the Court would consider it safe and reasonable to infer or presume the conspiracy. In R. v. Brisac 4 East 164, 171 which was cited with approval by the House of Lords in England in Mulcahy v. R.L.R. 3 H.L. 306, 317, it was laid down as a matter of law that in criminal practice, proof of the existence of conspiracy is generally a "matter of inference deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties concerned, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them". It is well recognised in law that conspiracy may exist between persons who have never seen each other or corresponded with each other: R v. Parnell 14 Cox 508 at p. 515. Indeed, in order to convict of conspiracy, it is not necessary that the accused persons concerned should have concocted the scheme, the subject of that charge, nor that they should have originated it. If a conspiracy is formed and a person joins it afterwards, he is equally guilty with the original conspirators. See: R. v. Simmonds (1969) 1 Q.B. 685." - Per Udoma, J.S.C. in Gregory Godwin Daboh & Anor. v. The State Suit No. S.C. 402/1975; (1977) 11 N.S.C.C. 309 at 319; (1977) 5 S.C. 197 at 222 - 223.

(2) "In a charge of conspiracy, evidence of the mere agreement of the parties, express or implied is sufficient for a conviction see R. v. Adebanjo (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 315. The offence lies not in the doing of the thing, but in the agreement to do the unlawful thing see R. v. David (1960) W.N.L.R. 170 The difficulty in determining the nature of the agreement in conspiracies has necessitated drawing reasonable inferences of such agreement from the acts of the parties." - Per Karibi Whyte, J.S.C. in Joseph Okosun & Ors. v. Attorney General, Bendel State Suit No. S.C. 252/1984; (1985) 16 N.S.C.C. (Pt. II) 1327 at 1338; (1985) 11 S.C. 194 at 213.

(3) "It is established law that it is not necessary in a conviction for conspiracy, that the conspirators should come together for the purpose or that there should have been previous...