AND AND 'OR' IN A STATUTE

• Date: 07 September 2019

(1) "It is now settled law that the word "or" is disjunctive depending on the context as under certain circumstances the word "and" would be head in place or "or" so as to carry out the intention of the legislature. For the general interpretation of the intention of the legislature. For the general interpretation of the word "or", see section 18(3) of the interpretation Act, Cap. 192." - Per Onnoghen, J.S.C., in Kabirikim v. Emefor Suit No. S.C. 242/2002; (2009) 14 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1162) 602 at 623.

(2) "In my view, the word "Or" used in a statute is constructed disjunctively while the word "and" is used conjunctively. The word "or" is used to create each item or subhead in a statute and it is therefore disjunctively used. In the case of Ndoma- Egba v. Chukwuogor (2004) 2 S.C.N.J. 117 at 123, (2004) 6 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 869) 382 at 409 this Court held per Uwaifo, J.S.C., as follows: - "In ordinary usage, the word "Or" is disjunctive and "and" is conjunctive. But it is conceded that there are situations which would make it necessary to read "and" in place of "Or" and vice versa. This may occur in order to carry out the intention of the legislature. See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. 12th edn. Pages 232-234. Instances can be found in such cases as John G. Stein & Co. Ltd. v. O’hanlon (1965) A.C. 890: R. v. Oakes (1959) 2 Q.B. 350; and Re Mills (1967) 2 W.L.R. 580. Such interpretation may be quite useful in order to avoid absurd or impracticable results. Short of such dilemma, it is the law that the literal rule is the golden mate wand of interpretation when the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous. It is a fundamental rule that such words should be given their ordinary plain meaning. It is not in such circumstances permissible to refrain from its meaning, even though it gives unreasonable or unfair result, and to go outside what the words themselves actually convey, in an attempt to consider what other things they ought to be capable of meaning." See also section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act Cap. 192 LFN 1990. Applying the above principles enunciated, it is my considered view that the provisions of section 2(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law Cap. 25 of the laws of Northern Nigeria 1963 - should be read disjunctively and given its ordinary plain meaning, as it was not ambiguous." - Per Muntaka-Coomassie, J.S.C., in Kabirikim v. Emefor Suit No. S.C. 242/2002; (2009) 14 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1162) 602 at 640 - 641.

(3) "In ordinary...